Проблемите за ВСУ в Соледар настъпиха след изтеглянето на 93-та механизирана бригада оттам - най-доброто военно подразделение на Украйна от началото на войната, признато и от руснаците. Близо четири месеца държаха стабилно фронта там.
Анализ на вчерашния ден от Том Купър
Ukraine War, 12 January 2023
Tom Cooper
I’m in a rush today, so let me get straight to the point.
Putin has reshuffled his chain of command for Ukraine, once again. Of course, it was on Shoygu to announce this in the public, then the greatest strategist of our times is never brought in relation to any bad news. Anyway, Valery Gerasimov — Chief of the Russian GenStab — is now the commander of the ‘Joint Group of Forces’ (see: all the Russian forces) in Ukraine. Surovikin was appointed one of his deputies, together with Oleg Salyukov and Alexey Kim. Official explanation: raising the level of leadership of the special operation, associated with the expansion of the scale of the tasks to solve, and the need to organise closer interaction between different branches…
Sounds like somebody there was constantly refusing to listen to Putin’s orders, and/or Gerasimov is horny about collecting all the credits for Surovikin’s ‘success’ in ‘de-electrifying Ukraine’ of the last days and weeks…
Thanks to Eric for this ‘illustration’.
In turn, President of the Republic of Poland has ordered his armed forces to hand over the first 20 Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine.
Simply great: this is not only far too little, far too late, but is going to greatly add to the already immense Ukrainian burden with spares and ammunition. Just for example: the 120mm tank ammo for Rheinmetal-designed guns of Leopards was the only sort of ammunition not yet used by the ZSU. Otherwise, Ukrainian armed forces are using literally everything, from NATO and Soviet/Russian-designed 5.56mm and 7.62mm bullets for assault rifles, via 100mm, 115mm, 125mm shells for Soviet-designed tank guns, to NATO ammo of 105mm for Slovenian-supplied T-55s. Not to talk about artillery ammo for guns calibre 75mm, 76mm, 100mm, 122mm, 152mm and 203mm… If the British could now really add a handful of — overweight/underpowered, but declared for ‘agile’ by the German TV-stations — Challenger 2s, then Ukraine is going to need tank ammo 120mm for L11 rifled guns, plus armoured recovery vehicles capable of moving stuff weighting 80 tons out of the local mud, too.
I’m so happy, can’t say….
AIR/MISSILE WARFARE
Sorry, I’m too short on time to discuss all the Russian artillery rocket attacks on Ukraine of the last few days. This is no disrespect to their victims: really a physical lack of time. Thus, let me just add that the Keystone Cops in Moscow claimed the downing of three aircraft of the Ukrainian Air Force on 10 January, and another three (all Su-25s) yesterday — and all of these by interceptors of the VKS. As usually, no evidence was provided, thus this must be truth, truth, and nothing but the truth. And everybody knows the Ukrainian Air Force was destroyed already 6–7 months ago, which is why this is simply an undisputable fact. For its part, Ukrainian Air Force is reporting some 17–18 combat sorties a day: circumstantial evidence is that the focus of operations by both air forces is in the Bakhmut area.
More importantly, I guess: RUMINT has it all the warships and submarines of the Russian Black Sea Fleet have sorties out of their ports in Sevastopol and Novorossisk. That’s including all the amphibious assault ships. Nobody knows why, at least not right now — and I’m not going to guess.
BATTLE OF DONBASS
While the Russians — and all the possible Putler-fans abroad — are celebrating the ‘liberation of Soledar’, and ‘destruction of the Ukrainian forces in this senseless defence’, the fighting in the town is in full swing, with lots of small-unit action, attacks and counterattacks, and persistent heavy shelling — by both sides. Some say there are no clear frontlines, but AFAIK: this is based on reporting from the last 24–36 hours, when there were none. Meanwhile, much of fighting is focusing on holding or securing one or another building (read: ruins of one or another building). Don’t know more details but to conclude: Ukrainians are holding the western side of the town, including the Mine №4. What’s going on in the centre, and south of Soledar: sorry, no idea.
Krasna Hora is holding out, as is whatever is left of Ukrainian positions on the northern and western fringes of Pidhorodne. The M03 is open, but the T0513 is blocked due to continuous Russian attacks in direction of Blahodatne, just for example. Ukrainian CASEVAC/MEDEVAC is working, too: whoever is wounded, is evacuated with help of armoured personnel carriers.
***
Now about the ‘coming-into-being’ of this situation in Soledar. The latest version circulated around the social media is that it all began in late December with the decision was taken, somewhere up the chain of command of the ZSU, to — starting with 1 January 2023 — withdraw elements of the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade from Soledar, and replace it with the 46th Airborne.
While Putin was then announcing his ‘cease-fire’, Surovikin should have exploited this opportunity to arrange a mass onslaught. And then, he should have attacked with the VDV just as the 128th was replaced by ‘several Territorial Defence units, but the 46th Airborne was not yet in position’. And, ‘of course’, when the Russian onslaught came, the Territorial Defence abandoned its position and fled…
The story goes on with the 46th then actually arriving and managing to ‘stabilise the situation, but some positions were lost’. And, in between all of this, the Russians widened their onslaught with sustained attacks on Krasna Hora and Pidhorodne, both held by the 24th Mech. At the high point of the Russian onslaught, back on 8–9 January, this lost about 80% of Pidhorodne and almost lost Krasna Hora, but then recovered it and held out.
I’ll dare some analysis of such rumours.
To make few things clear or at least bring back to your memory: I’m really nobody. I’m far from being even ‘an excellent source’, I’m not responsible, and have it easy to babble, complain and criticise. Therefore, it’s perfectly possible I’m now going to be both entirely wrong and unfair at the same time. But, I can’t help it: this story sounds like nonsense to me. It sounds like somebody there is back to the pattern of ‘blaming the usual suspect’. See: ‘it was the Territorial Defence that screwed up, nothing of this kind would happen to the ZSU’.
To say this is lame, would be an understatement.
Why?
I know of no evidence for any kind of TD units being deployed in the Soledar area over the last two weeks, if not longer. No photos, no reports. The nearest ‘non-ZSU’ brigade I know was in the Soledar area as of early January, was the 12th Operational. This is an unit of the National Guard, though, not of the TD. And it held Blahodatne. The nearest TD unit was the 241st Brigade, deployed in Bakhmut. Given both of these were busy on their own, I doubt anybody came to the idea to re-deploy them to Soledar.
Furthermore, after all the command skills demonstrated by the ZSU command for Bakhmut over the last few months, I am not prone towards expecting that command node, or anybody higher up the chain of command, coming to such a ridiculously absurd idea like, ‘replacing the 128th with TD-units’ while, quasi, ‘waiting for the 46th to arrive’… Doing such things is like if the character in question ordered the ZSU…sorry: Territorial Defence…to install a 10-metres-tall neon sign, ‘PLEASE, COME HERE AND KILL ALL OF US’ — above Soledar, on 1–2 January.
No doubt, after all the chaos with ‘stuffing the Soledar-Bakhmut-frontline full with elements from four different armed services and 25 different brigades and regiments’ of the last few days, it might appear as ‘logical’ to conclude that the Russians knew better where is what element of what ZSU brigade — than the HQ in Bakhmut knew. But really, there are limits of dilettantism. Even the sparrows in my garden know that the Russians have far better clue about where is what ZSU unit than all of us ‘not-involved observers’ and ‘armchair warriors’ are ever going to have. No doubt, the Russians are, generally, entirely clueless about where is what specific ZSU trench, bunker, group of troops or else, but they do know what ZSU unit is deployed along a specific sector of the frontline; which one is moving in, which out etc. This even more so considering
- …the Russian reaction to the ‘withdrawal’ of the 128th: the Russians (i.e. the Russian social media) — and especially survivors of what used to be the 79th Division VDV — ‘love’ this Ukrainian brigade, for they know what was it doing to them in northern Kherson, back in September and October. Thus, as soon as it began rotating out, they began claiming that the 128th is ‘abandoning’ its positions, even ‘fleeing’… Now, try to explain me that the Bakhmut HQ of the ZSU didn’t know about that…
- …or no end of Ukrainian reports in style of ‘heroes of the 46th saved the situation’.
Sorry, that’s all fairy tales for little kids: nothing that’s going to convince me (at least not without undisputable evidence).
Sometimes, one has to accept reality. The 46th might consist of combat-experienced battalions. However, as a brigade, it’s a ‘young’ formation, and it was entirely new to Soledar. It got hit — massively and unexpectedly — by the Russians while most vulnerable. ‘Shit happens’ at war. And, if anybody screwed up, then the higher command nodes, when deciding to rotate units right at the time Putin was announcing his ‘cease-fire’. The quality of Putin’s cease-fires is ‘news’ to Ukraine, but ‘no news at all’ to anybody who has monitored Putin’s Russians in Syria. Now the ZSU was taught that lesson, too.
