новорегистриран3

500-600 човека максимум.

Лимански котел. Предположително са обкръжени 2 роти на донбасците и 2 роти на резервистите от барс.

Ако прогнозирания американски БВП се превалутира от долари в юани, ефектът би бил същия - номиналната разлика се увеличава. Но това е единичен случай и не може да промени траекторията на китайския възход. Защото китайците вече започват да наблягат на качеството на растежа, а не толкова на количеството му. Което в комбинация с демографския срив в китайските села и градчета е предпоставка за рязък ръст на БВП на човек. Нещо подобно като при нас.

Пишат, че руските войски са почнали да се връщат в Беларус.

Голямата игра в Централна Азия... Интересно, че по времето на кайзерова, ваймарска и хетлерова Германия е било популярно мнението сред управленските среди, че "англосаксонците" искат да унищожат Германия... Риторика, прихваната от съветската пропаганда...

Проблемът на Шиф е същия като на Самърс. Те разсъждават изключително от гледна точка на случващото се в континенталната част на САЩ, като останалия свят е просто фон. Обаче нещата не са така... Да, вдигането на лихвите ще създаде големи проблеми за простолюдието и американската икономика като цяло. Обаче и двамата не вникват в същността на проблемите - сегашните проблеми на световната икономика започнаха в... Китай, а не в САЩ. Печатането на трилиони и трилиони долари от 2008 насам само удължи статуквото и позволи на Pax Americana да се задържи на повърхността. Само толкова. От 2009 до 2021 световната икономика имаше един главен двигател и това беше китайския строителен сектор, не американския. Кризата, с която се сблъсква света в момента, по-точно кризите, са кризите на китайската икономика... Вирусът тръгна първо от Китай. Енергийната криза първо тръгна от Китай. Световната инфлационна вълна започна от Китай...Всичко останало е следствие на китайските проблеми и естествено наместване на финансовите и валутните пазари, веригите за доставка и т.н. Така поставен въпроса показва, че фундаментите, на които се крепи Pax Americana вече не издържат, независимо от хвърлените трилиони. Като с времето нужните средства стават все по-големи и по-големи. А на Китай повече не може да се разчита, за да поглъща американската инфлация. Напротив, КНР вече достига момент в развитието си, когато започва да генерира твърде много инфлация, която трябва да бъде пратена някъде - за целта трябва развита финансова система и колониална империя. А американците са въвлечени в противоборство с китайците, победителят от което ще води човечеството към изследването на космоса. И курса на долара е едно от малкото реални средства останали на американците, с които могат да повлияят на китайската икономика. 2015 имаха ограничен успех, да видим сега какво ще постигнат.

S. Korea to hike natural gas prices in Oct. "The hike reflects soaring global natural gas prices and a recent surge in the won-dollar exchange rate," the ministry said. International gas prices have been trending high amid increased uncertainty surrounding the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) market, which stems from the war in Ukraine and disrupted gas supplies to Europe, it said. According to the ministry, Asian spot natural gas prices soared to $47 per one million Btu in the third quarter of the year, compared with $2.5 in July 2020.

Един от водещите финансови анализатори току що изрази интересна мисъл - ЦБ-тата са в цугцванг. Ситуация, в която никога не сме били. И развитите пазари започват да се държат като развиващи се... https://twitter.com/i/spaces/1lPKqBarDWwGb?s=20 Интервюто продължава и в момента.

Larry Summers Pre-Empts Coming Crash, Says Market Feels Like 2007 It's a curious coincidence that the day the name of Jeff Epstein's close buddy, Larry Summers, was being thrown around as the next Treasury secretary, Clinton's Treasury Secretary and Obama's top economist issued the loudest warning yet that something is about to break, and not just in the UK but in the US. As a reminder, earlier today Rabo's Michael Every said this: ... because, according to Bloomberg, in Larry's latest bid to frontrun the coming crash and then say "I told you so" even though it was his policies in the late 1990s that enabled the current crash possible, the former (and future) Treasury Secretary likened the risks facing the global economy to the pre-crisis summer of 2007, with the UK’s current troubles just one example of potential breakdowns. “We’re living through a period of elevated risk,” Summers told Bloomberg Television’s “Wall Street Week” with David Westin. “In the same way that people became anxious in August of 2007, I think this is a moment when there should be increased anxiety.” The summer of 2007 was when markets briefly plunged after the entire quant space went haywire for a few days, prompting substantial losses across all asset classes; the move was prompted by the first signs of strains over a collapsing US housing market, eventually morphing one year later into the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Besides the UK, “I don’t there’s any sign that I see -- yet -- of other markets being disorderly,” said Summers, a Havard University professor and paid contributor to Bloomberg Television. “But we know that when you have extreme volatility, that’s when these situations are more likely to arise.” According to Summer, some of the dynamics behind the current fragility are substantial leverage, uncertainty about the economic policy outlook, unease about high rates of underlying inflation, volatility in commodities and geopolitical tensions tied to Russia’s Ukraine invasion and to China. One particular area to monitor is the strains inherent in Japan’s policies right now, the former Treasury chief said, echoing what we said back in March (see "Yen At Risk Of "Explosive" Downward Spiral With Kuroda Trapped... And Why China May Soon Devalue") Pointing out what our readers have known for much of the past year, Summers said that - like the BOE - on one hand, Japan has been withdrawing liquidity from its markets, through its purchases of yen last week in an effort to support the exchange rate. But on the other hand, it’s injecting liquidity through the Bank of Japan’s continuing monetary easing. It’s an “extraordinary thing” Summers said adding that “It will be interesting to see how that plays out." Japanese investors have “vast holdings” of fixed-income securities around the world, and that will be something to keep an eye on, he said. Turning to the UK, Summers said that “we’re in very complex and uncharted territory,” warning that while the Bank of England’s intervention in the gilt market stabilized things for a time, that won't last, noting that the BOE’S plan is for operations to continue until Oct. 14. The key problem - according to the man who single-handedly redefined unsustainable economic policy - is that markets don’t believe UK macroeconomic policy is sustainable. “It’s not going to stay stable forever on the basis of two weeks buying -- and it’s probably not even going to stay stable for two weeks, unless there is a sense that this is a bridge to the fundamentals being fixed,” Summers said of UK markets. “And that’s not what we are seeing from the indications we’re getting this morning.” Summers, who served at the Treasury during the Clinton administration and was director of the White House National Economic Council under President Barack Obama, said that given the current risks, “this is certainly not a time when very many firefighters should be taking vacations.” “When a country as major as Britain is going through something like this, that is something that can have consequences that go beyond,” Summers noted. He likened financial troubles to tremors before an earthquake. While sometimes the tremors pass, that’s not always the case -- as was true in 2007, he said. ----- Естествено Самърс разсъждава от гледната точка на еднополярен свят, в който всичко започва и свършва с Pax Americana. Само че сегашната криза започна със срива на китайския имотен пазар, а всичко останало са само следствия от края на китайското десетилетия на икономически и политически възход. Нека не забравяме, че световната енергийна криза и последвалата инфлационна вълна също тръгнаха от... КНР. А това че Фед си повишава лихвите, като нищо е част от по-големите усилия за преструктуриране на американската икономика. Не че няма и обективни фактори, които да принуждават американците да затягат политиката си, де.

Германският автосектор харесва това. Нали си спомняте нашата дискусия за Унгария и немската търговска империя? Мерцедес, БМВ и Ауди са във възторг от Орбан. Само за един ден унгарците се приближиха до българския жизнен стандарт и в момента се съревновават с нас кой е най-беден в ЕС. Стойността на труда на унгарците измерен в евро спада... Френският автосектор също, изобщо западноевропейските олигарси биха харесали едно рязко поевтиняване на еврото... Само на нас, обикновените европейци няма да ни хареса.

В момента интересното е край Лиман.

Exclusive: China's state banks told to stock up for yuan intervention Миналата седмица интервенираха централните банки на Корея и Япония, тази седмица е ред на английската и китайската. Остава само ЕЦБ. А Фед все така отказва суапови сделки. "Случайно"...

Може и да не е с Тайван, а с Виетнам.

Наистина имаме някакъв римейк на събитията от 70-те и 80-те, само че днес нещата се случват по-бързо. И нивата на дълг са далеч по-високи. Но както тогава, така и днес англичаните първи капитулираха пред долара. Така и така са 51-я щат защо си губят времето да си играят на финансово независими и не приемат долара?! Та, всичко случващо се в момента е добре известно на Фед, включително рисковете за американската и световната финансова система, а от там и света. Въпреки това американците затягат финансовата си политика, което несъмнено ще смачка икономиката. И вероятно това е целта - промяна на икономиката и преход към нова Нова икономика. Само че този път финансовия сектор ще бъде поставен в определени рамки и нови сектори ще получат своето ускорение. Някои от тях, мисля, свързани със зеления преход. Например: комерсиализация и внедряване на системите за умни домове. Отдавна се работи по създаване на потребителско поведение насочено към използване на такъв тип системи, само икономическата среда не го налагаше. Обаче сега, изведнъж, ще се появи. А този тип системи са необходими, защото намаляват потреблението на енергия и допускат гъвкавост при производството и потреблението ѝ за собствени нужди. В зависимост от параметрите на ползваната система, може да се намали потреблението с 10-20 и повече процента. От икономическа, финансова и екологична гледна точка това е доста. И още много такива нововъведения в ежедневния живот на обикновените американци.

Мислех, че само при нас може да има призиви като "братя не купувайте", но явно съм грешал... Former vice finance minister criticizes Koreans for buying dollars И тъй като Корея е ветропоказателя на световната икономика, да очакваме още подобни призиви из целия свят.

С такъв интензитет руските ВВС успешно достигат капацитета на някои от по-силните натовски членки като фиром, Албания, Естония, Исландия и подобни... Май и чугунените бомби от времето на Брежнев започнаха да свършват... На руснаците им останаха само няколко чугунени кратуни от Задунайская.

Кой би си помислил, че напечатването на 150 милиарда паунда за "подпомагането" на частния сектор в Англия плюс уволняването на ключови чиновници в английското финансово министерство и рязането на данъците на богатите, при и без това огромния английски бюджетен дефицит, може да доведе до валутна и финансова криза?! https://www.ft.com/content/9571c1f7-55b2-42ac-a126-ec0fcdeefca4

Central Bankers Are Gaslighting Us about the "Strong Dollar" On February 8, the Japanese yen fell to a twenty-four-year low against the dollar, dropping to 143 yen per dollar. Not much has changed since then, with the yen hovering between 142 and 144 per dollar. In September 2021, one only needed 109 yen to buy a dollar. Overall, the yen has dropped 21 percent against the dollar over the past year, yet Japan’s central bank apparently has no plans to change course. Nor should we expect it to. Japan’s debt load has become so immense that any attempt to raise interest rates or otherwise tighten monetary conditions would prove extraordinarily painful. So, it’s no surprise the Bank of Japan (BOJ) is now positioned to become the last central bank clinging to negative interest rates. It’s Not Just Japan The yen is sliding the most among the world’s major currencies, but it’s not alone. Over the past year, the euro has fallen 14 percent against the dollar, while the pound has fallen 13 percent. Even the Chinese yuan, which is subject to even more currency manipulation than the West’s currencies, has fallen against the dollar. All of this means we’re hearing a lot about the supposedly “strong dollar,” but not in a good way. Rather, discussions of the reputedly strong dollar describe it as harmful and explore ways to make the dollar weaker as soon as politically feasible. Such talk must be heartily opposed, of course, as the dollar is not “too strong,” Rather, talk of the dollar’s “strength” is not really about the dollar at all. It’s about the weakness of other currencies, and it’s about how other central banks have embraced monetary policy that’s even worse than that of the US Fed. If, say, other national governments and central banks are concerned about the dollar being too strong, those institutions are welcome to embrace policies that will strengthen their own currencies. Instead, we’ll hear about how the Fed must “do something” to weaken the dollar through more easy money, and thus stick it to Americans who hold dollars by lessening their purchasing power. “We Didn’t Inflate Currency X Too Much. It’s All the Dollar’s Fault” A perfect example of how this rhetoric works comes from the Bank of Japan’s governor, Haruhiko Kuroda, in July. As the yen was really starting to slide against the dollar, he opined that “this is not so much a yen weakness as a dollar strength.” Kuroda said these words after years of negative rates, and right after the BOJ had doubled down on buying up “vast quantities of bonds” to force down interest rates and borrowing costs. Kuroda’s words also came weeks after the Swiss National Bank raised interest rates for the first time in fifteen years. That was just one more example of how dovish the European Central Bank (ECB) was compared to other banks, and yet Kuroda managed to say with a straight face that this is all about the dollar. This is the sort of talk we should learn to expect on the “strong dollar.” The central banks, who are devaluing their currency, aren’t to blame, you see. It’s the dollar’s fault. Other critiques of the strong dollar are less explicit on this last point and are more in the business of priming the pump to convince us all that a slightly less weak dollar is a bad thing. Blaming a “Strong” Dollar Rather than Weak, Inflated Currencies Consider a CNN article from earlier this month titled “America’s Strong Dollar Is Hurting Everyone Else.” The article makes many correct factual statements. It notes that when the dollar is less weak, countries with even weaker currencies will have greater trouble paying back debt denominated in dollars. There’s a whole lot of debt in the world denominated in dollars, including sovereign debt. The article also correctly notes that countries using weaker currencies will have problems importing goods and services when payments must be made in stronger currencies. Think of the situation in Sri Lanka or Pakistan. Moreover, when a less weak dollar is due to relatively high interest rates in the dollar zone (as is currently the case), this can mean capital flight from countries with weaker currencies: investors want dollars to invest in relatively high-interest US securities. That’s all true, and it’s all bad news for these countries, whose currencies make the dollar look good by comparison. But note how the framing squarely places the blame for these problems on a “strong dollar” rather than on the weakness of other currencies. As a final example, consider Friday’s article at CNBC about how a “strong dollar hurts investors.” Specifically, “A strong dollar crimps income that companies earn abroad, since money brought in in the form of weaker foreign currencies is converted into fewer dollars.” Again, this is technically true, but framing this as a “strong dollar” problem is odd. The real problem here isn’t that the dollar is too strong. The problem is that the investors didn’t properly anticipate the true risks involved in investing in these countries, where central banks are at least as irresponsible as the American central bank. In all these cases, the problem is never that the dollar is “too strong.” The problem is that other central banks are even worse, and that depreciation of other currencies is causing instability, lost wealth, and economic crises. The fact that American central bankers—forced by mounting populist pressure over Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation in the US—have slightly reined in monetary inflation in the US is hardly a reason to beat our breasts over the supposedly Herculean strength of the US dollar. Rather, we should be focusing on “the weak euro,” “the wimpy yen,” and the “tragic Sri Lankan rupee.” Nonetheless, central bankers and their media allies are trying to gaslight us into thinking the problem is the dollar’s strength. American central bankers are guilty of much, but it’s not their fault that central bankers elsewhere are so often even more capricious. If it all stopped there, then we might be able to just write it all off as a missed opportunity to learn the lessons of weak currency. But unfortunately, talk about a strong dollar often leads to political shenanigans. After Fed chairman Paul Volcker substantially raised interest rates in the US in the early 1980s, the dollar became much stronger compared to foreign currencies. The alleged problems of a strong dollar soon became a popular topic among politicians, both foreign and domestic. French, German, Japanese, and British politicians then began lobbying the US government to devalue the dollar for the benefit of foreign currency. Three years later, US government politicians caved under pressure, spurred by half-baked economic orthodoxy about the alleged value of a weak currency. American policy makers thus embraced the Plaza Accord in 1985, and the US dollar began to lose value and purchasing power soon thereafter. This, of course, came at the expense of American savers and consumers. The inflationists won, and a new generation learned that talk of a “strong dollar” is often quickly followed by calls for devaluation. It is unlikely to be any different this time. ----- Към списъка трябва да се добавят английските държавни финансисти, които само за седмица успяха да доведат страната си на ръба на финансова депресия и разбиха механизма на работа на финансовата си система. Защото не може постоянно хем да се вдигат лихвите, хем да се печатат маса пари. Резултатът ще е сходен като с методите на Ердоган за борба с инфлацията - отчетена официално 80+%, а реална наближаваща към 200%. The global spread of ‘pound shock’　 The global financial market is teetering as the “pound shock,” in which the value of the British pound fell to an all-time low, hit the Asian and European stock markets, followed by the New York Stock Exchange in the U.S. The decline in the value of the British pound will cause a setback in debt repayment and even warns that a “financial crisis originating in the U.K.” may occur. This refers to the “king dollar” phenomenon, which means the superstrength of the dollar could shrink world trade as the currencies of other countries fall one after another. This coincided with concerns about an economic slowdown in the U.S. central bank, the Federal Reserve. The exchange rate of the British pound against the U.S. dollar declined by about 5 percent on Tuesday (local time), falling to an all-time low of 1.03 U.S. dollars, and then opened the market with an upward trend Tuesday. The previous low was 1.05 dollars on February 26, 1985. The pound's exchange rate rose to 1.09 dollars during the day. Still, contrary to market expectations, when the Bank of England (BOE) did not implement an emergency rate hike, it plunged close to the 1.06-dollar range, displaying market fluctuations. As anxiety spread over the sharp plunge in the pound, the five-year U.K. government bond yield rose to 4.603 percent on the same day, the highest since September 2008, during the global financial crisis. The three major U.S. stock indexes also fell all at once due to the pound shock. Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 fell 1.03 percent on Tuesday from the previous day, hitting a new low for the year. The Dow fell more than 20 percent from its previous high and entered a bear market. S&P 500 fell 1.03 percent to a new low for the year.

Is China Running Out of Policy Space to Navigate Future Economic Challenges? After making progress slowing the pace of debt accumulation prior to the pandemic, China saw its debt levels surge in 2020 as the government responded to the severe economic slowdown with credit-led stimulus. With China currently in the midst of another sharp decline in economic activity due to its property slump and zero-COVID strategy, Chinese authorities have responded again by pushing out credit to soften the downturn despite already high levels of debt on corporate, household, and government balance sheets. In this post, we revisit China’s debt buildup and consider the growing constraints on Chinese policymakers’ tools to navigate future economic challenges. China’s Waves of Debt Previous posts have explored China’s credit boom and rise of household debt. China’s policy response to the global financial crisis in 2009 unleashed nearly ten years of uninterrupted growth in debt, with credit to the nonfinancial sector exploding by almost 150 percent of GDP, according to data from the Bank for International Settlements—one of the largest increases in modern history. It was not until 2018 that Chinese authorities were able to briefly stabilize these debt ratios through a hard-fought “deleveraging campaign.” China’s debt ratio resumed its upward trend in 2019, but then exploded again in 2020 as China was the first country in the world to respond to the pandemic. China’s run-up in credit in 2020 totaled nearly 29 percentage points of GDP but was short-lived, as the credit ratio contracted modestly in 2021. As COVID-19 spread globally, other countries’ policy responses were also associated with rising debt ratios, with China’s increase comparable to that of other countries, as illustrated in the chart below. However, while other major economies in the world are now tightening their monetary policies, expectations are for overall debt in China to rise again in 2022 to stabilize growth. China’s repeated reliance on credit-driven stimulus raises questions about the buildup of risks in the financial system and the extent to which rising debt levels in all three sectors—discussed below—are sustainable and could ultimately hamstring Chinese authorities’ policy options. China Has Seen a Sharp Run-Up in Debt Levels Source: Bank for International Settlements via CEIC. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back As illustrated in the chart below, China’s total nonfinancial sector credit was almost 290 percent of GDP at the end of 2021. Borrowing by the corporate sector—the largest part of China’s total debt—is equivalent to approximately 153 percent of GDP, a figure that is among the highest in the world. China’s deleveraging campaign was effective in curbing runaway growth in shadow credit, but growth in corporate leverage resumed with pandemic-related stimulus. While estimates vary, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) account for around 50 to 60 percent of total corporate debt, with the remainder held on Chinese privately owned corporate balance sheets. Entities known as local government financing vehicles are also classified as corporate debt in China, although a large portion of these debts are assumed to be implicit government debt, as discussed in the next section. Repayment concerns involving corporate debt in China primarily relate to lending to inefficient SOEs and distressed real estate developers, with the latter the focus of authorities’ efforts over the past two years to reduce leverage in the property sector. Corporate, Household, and Government Debt Have All Increased Notably Source: Bank for International Settlements via CEIC. Household debt accounts for 62 percent of GDP in China and has grown rapidly in recent years, raising concerns around increasingly stretched household balance sheets. China’s household debt has risen to levels that are quite high by developing country standards but remain broadly comparable to those of developed economies. As illustrated in the two charts below, the ratio of household debt to income in China is currently estimated to be in a range above the median for the economies in the OECD, while household debt service ratios have increased steadily and now exceed those in the United States, approaching even Korea. Household Debt, in Particular, Has Surged Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) via CEIC. Notes: The estimation range shown in the left panel uses household debt as reported by the BIS in the numerator and disposable income as reported by the sum of compensation of labor and property income in the flow of funds (lower range) and the household survey (upper range). The lower and upper ranges shown in the right panel use disposable income reported in the flow of funds (labor compensation and property income) and the household survey, respectively. Mortgage loans make up roughly 63 percent of China’s total household debt (39 percent of GDP). Chinese authorities’ recent focus on curbing excesses in the property sector—and intermittent COVID-related lockdowns—have slowed mortgage growth notably, to under 10 percent year over year as of July after averaging more than twice that pace over the past six years. Property developers’ struggles to complete construction of pre-sold properties have likely added to the debt burdens of Chinese households, who are waiting to move into new properties yet still making rental or mortgage payments on current residences. In response, an increasing number of home buyers in China have threatened to suspend mortgage payments on undelivered homes, increasing financial risks to banks and developers. Officially recognized central and local government debt in China is moderate by international standards, at about 50 percent of GDP. However, estimates of “augmented” fiscal debt are much higher, at up to 100 percent of GDP for year-end 2021, according to IMF estimates. The sizable gap between these numbers represents debt that has been issued for fiscal purposes—typically categorized as corporate loans—and likely requires implicit fiscal assistance to be serviced or repaid, or that could be recognized as official debt under some circumstances. This “hidden” government debt is almost entirely borne by local governments, which are highly reliant on the property sector for financing and have much less fiscal flexibility than the central government. Is China Heading for a Financial Crisis? International experience suggests that rapid buildup of debt is often followed by financial crises or at least extended periods of much slower economic growth. Thus far, China has managed to avoid a severe day of reckoning, and Chinese authorities are still viewed as having considerable policy tools to manage the nation’s economy and associated financial risks These tools stem from unique features of the Chinese political and financial system. For example, China’s government maintains direct and indirect control of the country’s financial and nonfinancial sectors at the central and local level, including through ownership of most of the banks in the financial system and a significant portion of nonfinancial corporate firms. In addition, China’s domestic economy is shielded from external shocks by its current account surplus, large stock of foreign exchange reserves, and capital controls. Finally, China possesses ample scope to use monetary, credit, and central government fiscal policies to dampen economic fluctuations, as reflected in the response to the pandemic. Despite this unique array of policy tools, China has not been immune to financial turbulence over the past decade. China experienced an interbank market crisis in 2013, equity market busts in 2007 and 2015, massive capital outflows in 2015-16, a spate of bank failures in 2019, and most recently a crisis in its property sector accompanied by additional pressures on parts of its banking sector. Against such a backdrop, there are strong reasons to be watchful for signs of a sustained downshift in China’s historical pattern of economic performance. First, there is evidence that China’s credit-driven growth model is facing serious diminishing returns, as shown, for example, in the high and steadily increasing incremental capital to output ratio (shown in the chart on left below) and rising credit intensity (shown in chart on right). The decline in the “GDP bang for the credit buck” suggests that the old playbook of turning on the credit spigots will be less effective than in the past, while leading to the potential for increases in bad debt. Our colleague, Matthew Higgins, has written more extensively on the self-limiting nature of capital accumulation as a growth driver in China. Is China’s Credit-Driven Growth Model Now Pushing on a String? Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China and the People’s Bank of China, via CEIC. Notes: Left panel shows five-year moving average. Incremental capital to output ratio (ICOR) is calculated as the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP divided by real GDP growth. In right panel, data shown for 2022 are through June. Credit intensity of GDP is the ratio of the incremental increase in credit over the incremental increase in GDP on a three-year moving average. Second, fiscal and monetary policies appear to face political and institutional constraints that may not be readily apparent from the data. On the fiscal side, even though official debt levels appear quite manageable, local governments are experiencing rapidly increasing debt burdens that remain hidden in local government affiliated enterprises and financial institutions. Based on China’s historical precedent, addressing these issues will likely take years of reform and fiscal tightening, which will create an additional drag on growth. On the monetary side, the authorities likely face constraints on cutting interest rates and reserve requirements for fear of sparking capital outflows or weakening banks’ profitability and encouraging additional buildups of risky borrowing. Finally, China faces other important challenges that will represent a sharp departure from the conditions it has experienced since Deng Xiaoping launched the country on its path of economic reform roughly four decades ago. Most profoundly, China’s demographic profile is aging quickly, which will greatly increase old-age dependency and lead to a reduction in the working population. Moreover, as its share of global trade stops rising, China’s export engine eventually will downshift to a growth rate similar to that of world trade, or perhaps even lower. Against this backdrop, the medium- to long-term outlook for China’s economy will likely hinge more than ever on the quality of its economic and institutional policies. https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2022/09/is-china-running-out-of-policy-space-to-navigate-future-economic-challenges/ Скъпият долар само усложнява тези китайски проблеми.

Май наистина имаме някакъв римейк на рецесията от 1980-те. The global recession of 1982 was triggered by several developments, including the second oil shock of 1979; a tightening of monetary policies in the United States and other advanced economies; and the Latin American debt crisis (Kose et al. 2020). Oil prices rose sharply in 1979, partly owing to disruptions caused by the Iranian revolution, and this helped push inflation to new highs in several advanced economies. Partly in response, monetary policies were tightened significantly in several major advanced economies, including Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, causing sharp declines in activity and significant increases in unemployment rates in many cases in 1982-83. The increase in global interest rates and a collapse in commodity prices that stemmed from the weakening of global growth made it difficult for many Latin American countries to service their debts, resulting in debt crises in the region. The advanced economies were generally able to begin their recoveries relatively quickly, although unemployment in some cases remained relatively high. But the debt crisis contributed to long-lasting growth slowdowns in many EMDEs, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/185391583249079464/pdf/Global-Recessions.pdf Въпросът е какви ще са последствията от задаващата се сегашна рецесия? Например през 1980-те Великобритания загуби голяма част от производствения си сектор и миннодобивните компании. Но пък премина към икономика базирана на услугите, като регионите в северна и централна Англия понесли най-големия удар не са се възстановили до ден днешен. Този път, май, пострадалия ще е финансовия сектор и обслужващите го фирми. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early_1980s_recession#United_Kingdom Фактът, че днес английската ЦБ първа мигна или по политнекоректно капитулира пред Фед и започна да печата пари отново, показва че нещата ще са брутални за страните, които са по-бедни. https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/bank-england-capitulates-restarts-qe-due-significant-dysfunction-bond-market-material-risk Англия е родината на англосаксонците, та тя може да разчита на някакво по-така отношение от американците, когато нещата наистина загрубеят. От другите по-важни икономики само ЕС е достатъчно голям и богат, за да не му се стъжни съвсем картинката. Но всякаквите корейци, китайци, индийци и пр. ще страдат... Корейците, защото зависят твърде много от китайците (1/4 от износа), а за китайците... Китайците през годините може и да са предприели редица мерки, за да разширят влиянието си и да си осигурят нужните им ресурси. Но не мисля, че това ще е достатъчно, за да може те да преминат през задаващата се рецесия безпроблемно. Напротив! Сегашната рецесия/криза започна с краха на мотора на световната икономика - китайския имотен пазар. От там нататък всичко е ефекта на доминото. Руснаците усетиха миналата година нещата накъде отиват и се хвърлиха да си възстановяват империята. Ама и те затънаха в собственото си блато и май няма измъкване. Това е така! Особено важи за времето преди август 2015. Китайците тъкмо бяха пристъпили към създаването на собствен развит финансов сектор и американците ги удариха, та още не могат да се възстановят. От тогава Китай страда от недостиг на чуждестранна валута и има наложени капиталови контроли. Затова и китайските инвестиции и кредитиране нямат мащаба от преди 2015, а се харчи само по геополитически причини. И в момента азиатските страни с голяма експозиция към Китай страдат най-много. Тайланд, Ю.Корея, Тайван и т.н. харчат огромна част от валутните си резерви, за да предотвратят колапса на финансовите си системи и от там да предизвикат икономическа криза, по-тежка от тази от 1997, защото в момента нивата на задлъжнялост на частния сектор са безумни... Household, corporate debts amount to 2.2 times Korea’s GDP

Несъмнено 99-те процента ще платят цена, далеч по-висока от единия процент... Но все пак става въпрос за човешко общество, а в него винаги ще има вождове и индианци. И индианците са тези, които страдат, стадо от 99% овце, водена от 1% пъдари. Никой не ги пита 99% какво искат и как се чувстват. Има само разлика в нюансите. 99-те % в САЩ получават много повече от общата баница, отколкото руските 99%, което обуславя и защо има постоянен емиграционен поток от Русия към САЩ. Но това е друг въпрос и обратно към темата. 1. Другарят Си се е появил за пръв път от две седмици насам. 2. Британската ЦБ мигна първа срещу Фед.

Май вече имаме обкръжение в Лиман. https://t.me/militarymaps/29001 Раздвижване и край Въгледар.