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В допълнение към изказванията на Си и Ван И ще постна и тази статия, която разяснява подробно реалното отношение на Китай към Русия. Why China Will Not Support a Russian Invasion of Ukraine The reputational cost – both on the international stage and with the Chinese people – would be great if Beijing threw its support behind Russian aggression. Facing the Ukraine stand-off, the United States is very concerned about Russia and China’s interactions. For example, Pentagon press secretary John Kirby called China’s “tacit support” for Moscow “deeply alarming.” Kirby seemed to imply that China supports Russia’s possible invasion of Ukraine. U.S. concern is understandable, but some U.S. officials seem to be misjudging both China-Russia relations and China’s broader foreign policy. First, some Americans do not have a clear understanding of China-Russia military relations. China and Russia are not military allies. In other words, when one side is at war, the other side has no treaty or legal obligation to help. This is completely different from the military alliances between the United States and NATO countries. Therefore, even if Russia and Ukraine go to war, China has no obligation to support Russia. Indeed, during the Crimea crisis seven years ago, China did not openly support Russia’s position. On February 4, China and Russia issued a joint statement in which China did mention its support for Russia. But the nuance is important: China’s support for Russia focused on insisting that Moscow’s security concerns must be guaranteed by the West and opposing the threats to Russia’s security from NATO and other Western countries. Everyone knows China also faces pressure and security threats from the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, so it is not surprising that Beijing would support Russia in the face of similar pressure. However, this is not the same as China offering its approval of a Russian invasion against Ukraine. A comparison can help clarify China’s support in this case: China’s attitude to Russia is equivalent to its support for North Korea or Iran in their demands that the U.S. lift sanctions. China’s support does not mean Beijing would support North Korea starting a war on the Korea Peninsula or Iran striking Israel. China has maintained friendly relations both with Russia and Ukraine for a long time, which is a basic and balanced policy. During the Ukraine crisis, China never criticized Ukraine, only condemned the U.S. and NATO. Ukraine is well aware of it. 2022 marks the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Ukraine. President Xi Jinping of China and President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine exchanged congratulatory messages a month ago. Xi clearly mentioned he has always been committed to strengthening the friendly and cooperative relations with Ukraine. It is impossible for China to change its position after a month. In addition, the Chinese ambassador to Kyiv published an article in the Ukrainian media, publicly emphasizing that China has always supported Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. This is a clear sign that China could not support Russia’s possible invasion to Ukraine – especially because China has never publicly stated a view that Crimea belongs to Russia. If China is against a Russian invasion of Ukraine, why has Beijing not criticized Russia, like the West did? There are two main reasons. First, considering the Sino-Russian friendship, China’s public questioning of Russia will damage the friendship. At this time, Beijing should show solidarity, rather than emphasize differences – this is a question of both face and diplomatic skills. China will express its true attitude behind closed doors. Second, Russia may have privately assured China that it will not mount a direct invasion against Ukraine. That would explain why China has been accusing the U.S. and the NATO of exaggerating the crisis, and why Beijing has remained indifferent as the West withdraws both diplomats and citizens from Ukraine. In addition to jointly coping with Western pressure, there is a basic logic in the development of Sino-Russia relations: That is, the two neighboring countries must be friendly, and this friendship will benefit both sides. For example, China’s energy security can be met through Russian overland oil and gas pipelines, which reduces the risk of energy transportation in the Persian Gulf and the Malacca Strait. Russia will also gain huge economic benefits from its exchanges with China. As neighbors, it is a natural process for China and Russia to establish a partnership. Some Pentagon officials merely think about the issue of China-Russia cooperation from the perspective of the countries mutually facing Western pressure, without seeing this as a case of both international common sense and Chinese diplomatic skills. In the past year, there have been many high-level contacts between China and the United States, and they all said the two countries should avoid misjudgment of each other. The Pentagon’s interpretation of China’s support for Russia is exactly the sort of misjudgment that must be avoided. If a similar misinterpretation impacted an issue directly impinging China-U.S. relations, I am afraid this risk will be even greater. There are indeed some people in China who have similar views to some U.S. officials, believing the Chinese government actually supports Russia in a possible war. But they are mostly young people and nationalists with little experience. Their logic is that war in Eastern Europe will contain U.S. support for Taiwan, and mainland China can use this opportunity to recapture Taiwan. Therefore, when the nationalists heard Putin was going to negotiate more with the West, and even withdraw some troops from the military drills, they felt very disappointed. They thought China lost a good chance to solve the Taiwan issue. Although this idea is naive, it does exist in Chinese society. These nationalists, like some U.S. officials, completely miscalculated China’s freedom of action on the Taiwan issue. Just like Russia does not consider the Taiwan issue when it has a dispute with Ukraine, China will not consider the relationship between Russia and Ukraine in order to resolve the Taiwan issue. It’s quite different. If Putin insists on invading Ukraine one day, China can’t stop it. If China one day sends troops against Taiwan, Putin will not able to prevent that either. In my view, China will think more about morality and reputation when it comes to the Ukraine crisis, largely in order to take into account public opinion and Chinese people’s attitudes. American commentators don’t seem to realize the importance of either of these factors in China’s foreign policy. What would happen if China supported Russia’s possible invasion of Ukraine? First, it would put China in an awkward position in the international community. China has been shaping an international image of justice for decades. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were China’s foreign policy in the 1950s, and in the era of Xi Jinping, China still embraces these principles as the basis for international exchanges. The core of the Five Principles is mutual respect for each country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and mutual nonaggression. If China supports Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, it would be a violation of the bedrock of its 70-year-old foreign policy. China will lose its international moral high ground, as well as damage its international reputation and image. This will make it a little awkward for China to promote its Good Neighbor and Friendship Policy and the Five Principles. At times, urgent national interests may take precedence over principles, but China has no compelling interests at stake in Ukraine, certainly not enough to make Beijing willing to abandon its foundational foreign policy. The Chinese people also agree that China should uphold justice in the international arena. If China publicly endorses Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, it may be difficult for the Chinese people to understand the sudden change. As a result, such a move will cause the Chinese government to lose some ordinary Chinese support. Not long ago, a U.S. research institution suggested that China has a “silent majority” who do not like Chinese government policy, which is consistent with my observation. In my view, these people are not all anti-government or anarchists, but more silent dissenters who subtly boycott the overly nationalist atmosphere in today’s society. The Chinese government must know this as well. When making policies, it will consider the attitudes of as many people as possible and satisfy the interests of the most possible people, in order to smooth the way for domestic social management. With that in mind, it’s important to know that most Chinese have mixed views about Russia; some are outright negative. After all, Russia was one of the European powers that encroached on China during the “century of humiliation.” For many Chinese people, when the see the Ukraine crisis, they think of Russia’s territorial expansion into China more than 100 years ago. You will never see this point raised in the state media, but you can find it easily on Chinese social media. Many people comment on the Weibo page of the Russian embassy in China, asking Russia to return Haishenwai (Vladivostok in Russian) to China. As the crisis in Ukraine deepens, many Chinese netizens accuse Russia of being an aggressor. In this context, should China’s government support Russia in invading Ukraine, it will make more Chinese people doubt the justice and legitimacy of their own government, which is not good for maintaining social stability. Russian diplomats are well aware of this strain of Chinese public opinion. They treat it calmly and only emphasize Sino-Russian friendship. It shows that both China and Russia have left some flexibility and maneuvering space for each other. Beijing and Moscow understand they will not always be completely in lock-step. It’s time for Washington to grasp this point as well.

В продължение от предишния пост. Исторически погледната и географски обосновано, северната част на Корейския полуостров винаги е била по-милитаризираната част. В древността там са съществували държави като Когурьо/Корьо/Пуйо, който са били войнствени и са побеждавали не веднъж китайците. Докато южни държави като Шила и Пекче се фокусират върху търговията и връзките си с Китай. Ако погледнете историята ще видите, че първото обединение на полуострова се осъществява от прокитайската държава Шила. По-късно през чосонската династия северните граници на Корея са били мястото, където е разположена основната част от армията, за да спират нападенията на номадите идващи от Манджурия. Това идва да покаже, че сегашното положение, в което имаме разделение на Север и Юг, като КНДР е по-милитаризирана, а РК е по-търговски насочена, не е прецедент, а в една голяма част от историята е било норма. Отделно има историческа и географска предпоставка за това КНДР да не е прокитайски настроена, а точно обратното. За момента като че ли династията Ким успява да балансира що-годе успешно между зависимостта от вноса на нефт през тръбопровод от Китай, кражбата на технологии от Русия, неформалната подкрепа на определени кръгове в Япония и сложните отношения с Юга. Възможно е да има американска намеса, възможно е руска или японска. Може всичко да е солова акция. Няма как да знаем поради липсата на достатъчно информация. Но е факт, че Северна Корея предприе подобни стъпки именно покрай Олимпиядата (първо) и сложи край на инициатива, която щеше да донесе мир на полуострова (второ). И прокитайското лоби в Юга щеше да си осигури президентството на предстоящите избори там (трето). Твърде много зайци само с един замах. Да така е. Случилото се в годините след идването на власт на Ким Трети е всъщност кулминацията на процес започнал още по времето на дядото. Северът, за да бъде възприеман като равностоен партньор от Великите сили и за да има някаква разменна монета, трябва да има какво да предложи. Освен безумни лозунги и пропаганда за другаря-полубог (директно взаимствана от японците) друго какво може да предложи КНДР? Това е част от продължаващата дълги години игра на надхитряне между КНДР и всички останали членове на Шестстраната комисия. Пекин много би се радвал, ако американците успеят да укротят севернокорейците и това доведе до една нормализация. Все пак, не бива да се забравя, че отношенията между КНР и КНДР не са точно конфронтационни, а са балансирани/смесени. Има моменти на съюзничество, има и моменти на неприкрита неприязън. Например, преди да започнат срещите на Ким с Тръмп, Ким отиде до Китай. където се консултира със Си. Т.е. в Пхенян са счели, че трябва да отчетат и китайските интереси. Всеки американски стратег би желал да привлече Северна Корея на своя страна, само че северняците не са глупаци и знаят своята цена и важността си за Китай. Затова е и сложната игра на баланс, която провеждат - хем да са достатъчно отдалечени и независими от Пекин, хем да са достатъчно близки, за да имат формален външен партньор. Отделно не бива да забравяме, че Южна Корея все още е американски съюзник, което прави всякакви опити за сближаване на САЩ с КНДР твърде податливи. Но, сред елита на Юга има силно прокитайско лоби. Има и силно китайско културно влияние, което си е вървяло винаги. Все по-видими са сигналите, които излъчва "дълбоката държава" там и това се вижда от американците. Същевременно и отношенията между Севера и Китай не са точно съюзнически, а партньорство по сметка. От тази гледна точка има една геополитическа инерция, която ако се ускори може да доведе в бъдеще до преформатиране на статуквото на полуострова. Като заради демографския срив в Юга може да се окаже, че Севера, за пръв път от 1970-те е в по-силна позиция.

След всичките снощни фанфари има два варианта: 1. Подготвя се населението за широкомащабна война с Украйна 2. Отиваме към деескалация и на широката публика се дава хляб да се радва, докато реално путиновия блъф се е провалил.

Разсъждавате твърде много по европейски. Отново ще се повторя, че отношенията в този регион не са такива, каквито изглеждат! Да, от официалните данни изглежда, че Северна Корея е крайно зависима от Китай за нищожната си външна търговия. Само че севернокорейците имат морска контрабанда за какво ли не... В чужбина имат мрежи от ресторанти до клубове за проститутки, наемници, изнудване, каквото може да си помисли човек. Това са бизнеси за стотици милиони и милиарди долари. Все пак това не комунистически режим, а най-обикновена деспотия, в която царят е всемогъщ полубог-получовек, а всички останали са негови слуги. Като корейците са отделен вид човеци. Не случайно Северът се самоотъждествява с бившата династия Чосон, официалното име на КНДР е Чосонска народно-демократична република. Докато южняците се отъждествяват с Корейската империя просъществувала няколко години преди японците да я окупират Те Хан чегук, т.е. Великата корейска империя. Днес името на Юга е Великата корейска република - Те Хан мингук. Важен нюанс, за да се разбере същността на разделението север-юг. По времето на Ким Ил Сонг (познат у нас като Ким Ир Сен) най-големия севернокорейски търговски партньор е... Япония. Пак в същата тази Япония е допуснато децата на корейската диаспора да се обучават по севернокорейска образователна програма, а уебсайта на севернокорейската телеграфна агенция ползва японски хостинг. Всичката контрабанда с чия помощ се осъществява?! Да не говорим за ядерната програма, която е финансирана и от крайно десни японски кръгове. От Юга всяка година получават продоволствия за стотици милиони долари, голяма част от които биват препродадени на трети страни. Имал съм възможността да видя на живо как живеят обикновените севернокорейци и не мисля, че има особена разлика с времето, когато са властвали царете от Чосонската династия. Т.е. за севернокорейския елит човешкият живот на обикновения индивид не е от особено значение, а е важно да се поддържа обществения баланс, защото алтернативата е по-лоша. Дали някой ще гладува, децата няма да пораснат здрави, а населението масово ще е съставено от ниски, недохранени индивиди, това елита не го интересува. Китай има традицията да не се меси открито във вътрешните работи на съюзниците си, та за тази тема си мълчат. И много много гледа да не допуска заздравяване на икономиката на КНДР, а предпочита да поддържа сегашното състояние на икономическо развитие. Показателно е, че обема на китайско-севернокорейската търговия е сравним с българо-китайския стокообмен. Това са оценъчни данни на ООН или Юга, в които не се взима предвид размера на огромната контрабанда и сива икономика. Защо подценявате севернокорейците в областта на ракетостроенето? Когато корейската/чосонската армия е ползвала артилерия и ракетни проектили, на запад тепърва си е пробивал път барута. Имат вековни традиции в тази област! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hwacha https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singijeon И не е само това. Има стотици хиляди севернокорейски работници из цяла Азия и Източна Европа 2/3 от чиито заплати се прибира от държавата. Ясно е къде отиват тези пари. Първото по-сериозно вътрешнополитическо действие на Ким Джон Ън като дойде на власт бе да екзекутира чичо си (съпруг на леля му) и по-голямата част от съратниците му. По някаква случайност чичото е бил основния проводник на китайското влияние в КНДР, а съратниците му основната агентура проникла във всички цивилни и военни управленски позиции. В заключение само ще допълня, че изстрелването на няколко ракети в Източно море през януари тази година доведе до нещо много важно - бе сложен край на китайско-южнокорейската инициатива за официален край на Корейската война. Което би обезсмислило присъствието на американски войски в Юга и отслабило още повече ролята на Япония в Източна Азия.

Малко руски политически реализъм.

From nukes to the Olympics, China’s mushrooming Pyongyang problem The first few weeks of the year saw several important developments in China’s relations with North Korea, underlining Beijing’s deepening dilemma over its unruly communist neighbour. Last week, amid food shortages and economic hardship, Pyongyang resumed railway imports from China for the first time since early 2020. And, at the United Nations, Beijing again helped to block a US-led effort to impose further sanctions on North Korea, despite Pyongyang’s repeated missile tests. China’s generosity was met first with Pyongyang’s decision to skip the Beijing Winter Olympics, and then with a bombshell threat from leader Kim Jong-un that the North Korean regime may resume nuclear tests. The timing could not have been worse for China, North Korea’s top diplomatic backer and economic lifeline. For years, Beijing’s much-touted ability to keep Pyongyang in check has been seen as its most important diplomatic leverage in its dealings with the United States. The deterioration in US-China ties has made that leverage particularly critical, with North Korea’s denuclearisation one of the few issues of shared common interest. The North Korean Olympics no-show announcement followed a series of diplomatic boycotts of the Games – which open in Beijing on February 4 – from the US, Britain, Australia and Canada over China’s alleged human rights atrocities in Xinjiang. The first few weeks of the year saw several important developments in China’s relations with North Korea, underlining Beijing’s deepening dilemma over its unruly communist neighbour. Last week, amid food shortages and economic hardship, Pyongyang resumed railway imports from China for the first time since early 2020. And, at the United Nations, Beijing again helped to block a US-led effort to impose further sanctions on North Korea, despite Pyongyang’s repeated missile tests. China’s generosity was met first with Pyongyang’s decision to skip the Beijing Winter Olympics, and then with a bombshell threat from leader Kim Jong-un that the North Korean regime may resume nuclear tests. The timing could not have been worse for China, North Korea’s top diplomatic backer and economic lifeline. For years, Beijing’s much-touted ability to keep Pyongyang in check has been seen as its most important diplomatic leverage in its dealings with the United States. The deterioration in US-China ties has made that leverage particularly critical, with North Korea’s denuclearisation one of the few issues of shared common interest. The North Korean Olympics no-show announcement followed a series of diplomatic boycotts of the Games – which open in Beijing on February 4 – from the US, Britain, Australia and Canada over China’s alleged human rights atrocities in Xinjiang. It is not the first time Kim has used nuclear threats to pile pressure on the US over their deadlocked negotiations, but the timing of the latest announcement indicated it could also be aimed at China. If North Korea chooses to renew its nuclear provocations in the coming weeks, during the Beijing Games, it would be a slap in the face to the Chinese government, which has strongly opposed Pyongyang’s six previous nuclear tests. Resumed nuclear testing would kill the last hope for denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, shatter the little love and trust remaining between the communist neighbours, and reveal how limited China’s influence over North Korea has become. While Beijing increasingly considers the Kim regime a liability and is reluctant to accept another nuclear-armed state on its border, its biggest fear is that North Korea may enter into an anti-Chinese alignment with Washington. Kim clearly knows how to pit major powers like China, the US and its allies against each other and understands that China cannot afford to cut North Korea loose, at least for now, with Beijing-Washington rivalry at its height. But with regional stability and Beijing’s own security at stake over Pyongyang’s nuclear brinkmanship, the diplomatic cost for China’s support for North Korea may have become unbearably high. If Kim is determined to push ahead with his nuclear ambitions, he may also be pushing his country’s old friends in Beijing into facing the ultimate choice of whether to give up on Pyongyang. ----- Достатъчно неутрална статия, поклазваща гледната точка на част от китайския елит по въпроса със Северна Корея. Която за пореден път показва, че не всичко в Източна Азия е така, както изглежда. SEOUL— The North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, apparently signaling a shift in the North's long-standing insistence that U.S. troops leave South Korea, has opened the way to having at least some of them stay here, analysts said Wednesday. Kim Jong Il reportedly made clear his acceptance of a U.S. military presence in the South during talks in Pyongyang in June with President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea. "Those with Kim Dae Jung in the talks have said that Kim Jong Il said that U.S. forces may stay," said Choi Jin Wook, research fellow at the Korean Institute of National Unification, an adjunct of the Unification Ministry. The remark appeared logical, he said, as another in a series of suggestions by both Kim Jong Il and his father, Kim Il Sung, that they were in no hurry for U.S. troops to withdraw and would not demand a U.S. pullout as a prerequisite for reunification. Kim Jong Il succeeded his father, who ruled the North from 1945 until his death in 1994. https://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/10/news/a-north-korean-shift-on-opposing-us-troops.html North Korea has dropped its demand that American troops be removed from South Korea as a condition for giving up its nuclear weapons, South Korea’s president said Thursday in presenting the idea to the United States. President Moon Jae-in portrayed the proposal as a concession on the eve of talks involving the two Koreas and the United States. The North has long demanded that the 28,500 American troops be withdrawn, citing their presence as a pretext to justify its pursuit of nuclear weapons. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/19/world/asia/north-korea-american-troops-withdrawal-trump.html

Xi Jinping calls for diplomatic resolution of Russia-Ukraine dispute

Imperiling Europe's East In the event of a Russian victory in Ukraine, Germany‘s position in Europe will be severely challenged. Germany is a marginal military power that has based its postwar political identity on the rejection of war. The ring of friends it has surrounded itself with, especially in the east with Poland and the Baltic states, risks being destabilized by Russia. France and the United Kingdom will assume leading roles in European affairs by virtue of their comparatively strong militaries and long tradition of military interventions. The key factor in Europe, however, will remain the United States. NATO will depend on U.S. support as will the anxious and imperiled countries of Europe’s east, the frontline nations arrayed along a now very large, expanded, and uncertain line of contact with Russia, including Belarus and the Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine. Eastern member states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, will likely have substantial numbers of NATO troops permanently stationed on their soil. A request from Finland and Sweden to gain an Article 5 commitment and to join NATO would be impossible to reject. In Ukraine, EU and NATO countries will never recognize a new Russian-backed regime created by Moscow. But they will face the same challenge they do with Belarus: wielding sanctions without punishing the population and supporting those in need without having access to them. Some NATO members will bolster a Ukrainian insurgency, to which Russia will respond by threatening NATO members. Ukraine’s predicament will be very great. Refugees will flee in multiple directions, quite possibly in the millions. And those parts of the Ukrainian military that are not directly defeated will continue fighting, echoing the partisan warfare that tore apart this whole region of Europe during and after World War II. The permanent state of escalation between Russia and Europe may stay cold from a military perspective. It is likely, though, to be economically hot. The sanctions put on Russia in 2014, which were connected to formal diplomacy (often referred to as the “Minsk” process, after the city in which the negotiations were held), were not draconian. They were reversible as well as conditional. Following a Russian invasion of Ukraine, new sanctions on banking and on technology transfer would be significant and permanent. They would come in the wake of failed diplomacy and would start at “the top of the ladder,” according to the U.S. administration. In response, Russia will retaliate, quite possibly in the cyber-domain as well as in the energy sector. Moscow will limit access to critical goods such as titanium, of which Russia has been the world’s second-largest exporter. This war of attrition will test both sides. Russia will be ruthless in trying to get one or several European states to back away from economic conflict by linking a relaxation in tension to these countries’ self-interest, thus undermining consensus in the EU and NATO. Europe’s strong suit is its economic leverage. Russia’s asset will be any source of domestic division or disruption in Europe or in Europe’s transatlantic partners. Here Russia will be proactive and opportunistic. If a pro-Russian movement or candidate shows up, that candidate can be encouraged directly or indirectly. If an economic or political sore point diminishes the foreign policy efficacy of the United States and its allies, it will be a weapon for Russian propaganda efforts and for Russian espionage. Much of this is already happening. But a war in Ukraine will up the ante. Russia will use more resources and be unchained in its choice of instruments. The massive refugee flows arriving in Europe will exacerbate the EU’s unresolved refugee policy and provide fertile ground for populists. The holy grail of these informational, political, and cyberbattles will be the 2024 presidential election in the United States. Europe’s future will depend on this election. The election of Donald Trump or of a Trumpian candidate might destroy the transatlantic relationship at Europe’s hour of maximum peril, putting into question NATO’s position and its security guarantees for Europe. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-18/what-if-russia-wins

What if Russia Wins? A Kremlin-Controlled Ukraine Would Transform Europe When Russia joined the ongoing civil war in Syria, in the summer of 2015, it shocked the United States and its partners. Out of frustration, then President Barack Obama claimed that Syria would become a “quagmire” for Russia and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Syria would be Russia’s Vietnam or Putin’s Afghanistan, a grievous mistake that would eventually rebound against Russian interests. Syria did not end up as a quagmire for Putin. Russia changed the course of the war, saving Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from impending defeat, and then translated military force into diplomatic leverage. It kept costs and casualties sustainable. Now Russia cannot be ignored in Syria. There has been no diplomatic settlement. Instead, Moscow has amassed greater regional clout, from Israel to Libya, and retained a loyal partner in Assad for Russia’s power projection. In Syria, what the Obama administration failed to anticipate was the possibility that Russia’s intervention would succeed. In the surreal winter of 2021–22, the United States and Europe are once again contemplating a major Russian military intervention, this time in Europe itself. And once again, many analysts are warning of dire consequences for the aggressor. On February 11, British Minister of State for Europe James Cleverly predicted that a wider war in Ukraine “would be a quagmire” for Russia. In a rational cost-benefit analysis, the thinking goes, the price of a full-scale war in Ukraine would be punishingly high for the Kremlin and would entail significant bloodshed. The United States has estimated as many as 50,000 civilian casualties. Along with undermining Putin’s support among the Russian elite, who would suffer personally from the ensuing tensions with Europe, a war could endanger Russia’s economy and alienate the public. At the same time, it could bring NATO troops closer to Russia’s borders, leaving Russia to fight a Ukrainian resistance for years to come. According to this view, Russia would be trapped in a disaster of its own making. Nevertheless, Putin’s cost-benefit analysis seems to favor upending the European status quo. The Russian leadership is taking on more risks, and above the fray of day-to-day politics, Putin is on a historic mission to solidify Russia’s leverage in Ukraine (as he has recently in Belarus and Kazakhstan). And as Moscow sees it, a victory in Ukraine might well be within reach. Of course, Russia might simply prolong the current crisis without invading or find some palatable way to disengage. But if the Kremlin’s calculus is right, as in the end it was in Syria, then the United States and Europe should also be prepared for an eventuality other than quagmire. What if Russia wins in Ukraine? If Russia gains control of Ukraine or manages to destabilize it on a major scale, a new era for the United States and for Europe will begin. U.S. and European leaders would face the dual challenge of rethinking European security and of not being drawn into a larger war with Russia. All sides would have to consider the potential of nuclear-armed adversaries in direct confrontation. These two responsibilities—robustly defending European peace and prudently avoiding military escalation with Russia—will not necessarily be compatible. The United States and its allies could find themselves deeply unprepared for the task of having to create a new European security order as a result of Russia’s military actions in Ukraine. Many Ways to Win For Russia, victory in Ukraine could take various forms. As in Syria, victory does not have to result in a sustainable settlement. It could involve the installation of a compliant government in Kyiv or the partition of the country. Alternatively, the defeat of the Ukrainian military and the negotiation of a Ukrainian surrender could effectively transform Ukraine into a failed state. Russia could also employ devastating cyberattacks and disinformation tools, backed by the threat of force, to cripple the country and induce regime change. With any of these outcomes, Ukraine will have been effectively detached from the West. If Russia achieves its political aims in Ukraine by military means, Europe will not be what it was before the war. Not only will U.S. primacy in Europe have been qualified; any sense that the European Union or NATO can ensure peace on the continent will be the artifact of a lost age. Instead, security in Europe will have to be reduced to defending the core members of the EU and NATO. Everyone outside the clubs will stand alone, with the exception of Finland and Sweden. This may not necessarily be a conscious decision to end enlargement or association policies; but it will be de facto policy. Under a perceived siege by Russia, the EU and NATO will no longer have the capacity for ambitious policies beyond their own borders. The United States and Europe will also be in a state of permanent economic war with Russia. The West will seek to enforce sweeping sanctions, which Russia is likely to parry with cyber-measures and energy blackmailing, given the economic asymmetries. China might well stand on Russia’s side in this economic tit for tat. Meanwhile, domestic politics in European countries will resemble a twenty-first-century great game, in which Russia will be studying Europe for any breakdown in the commitment to NATO and to the transatlantic relationship. Through methods fair and foul, Russia will take whatever opportunity comes its way to influence public opinion and elections in European countries. Russia will be an anarchic presence—sometimes real, sometimes imagined—in every instance of European political instability. Eastern member states would have NATO troops permanently on their soil. Cold War analogies will not be helpful in a world with a Russianized Ukraine. The Cold War border in Europe had its flash points, but it was stabilized in a mutually acceptable fashion in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. By contrast, Russian suzerainty over Ukraine would open a vast zone of destabilization and insecurity from Estonia to Poland to Romania to Turkey. For as long as it lasts, Russia’s presence in Ukraine will be perceived by Ukraine’s neighbors as provocative and unacceptable and, for some, as a threat to their own security. Amid this shifting dynamic, order in Europe will have to be conceived of in primarily military terms—which, since Russia has a stronger hand in the military than in the economic realm, will be in the Kremlin’s interest—sidelining nonmilitary institutions such as the European Union. Russia has Europe’s largest conventional military, which it is more than ready to use. The EU’s defense policy—in contrast to NATO’s—is far from being able to provide security for its members. Thus will military reassurance, especially of the EU’s eastern members, be key. Responding to a revanchist Russia with sanctions and with the rhetorical proclamation of a rules-based international order will not be sufficient. Imperiling Europe's East In the event of a Russian victory in Ukraine, Germany‘s position in Europe will be severely challenged. Germany is a marginal military power that has based its postwar political identity on the rejection of war. The ring of friends it has surrounded itself with, especially in the east with Poland and the Baltic states, risks being destabilized by Russia. France and the United Kingdom will assume leading roles in European affairs by virtue of their comparatively strong militaries and long tradition of military interventions. The key factor in Europe, however, will remain the United States. NATO will depend on U.S. support as will the anxious and imperiled countries of Europe’s east, the frontline nations arrayed along a now very large, expanded, and uncertain line of contact with Russia, including Belarus and the Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine. Eastern member states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, will likely have substantial numbers of NATO troops permanently stationed on their soil. A request from Finland and Sweden to gain an Article 5 commitment and to join NATO would be impossible to reject. In Ukraine, EU and NATO countries will never recognize a new Russian-backed regime created by Moscow. But they will face the same challenge they do with Belarus: wielding sanctions without punishing the population and supporting those in need without having access to them. Some NATO members will bolster a Ukrainian insurgency, to which Russia will respond by threatening NATO members. Ukraine’s predicament will be very great. Refugees will flee in multiple directions, quite possibly in the millions. And those parts of the Ukrainian military that are not directly defeated will continue fighting, echoing the partisan warfare that tore apart this whole region of Europe during and after World War II. The permanent state of escalation between Russia and Europe may stay cold from a military perspective. It is likely, though, to be economically hot. The sanctions put on Russia in 2014, which were connected to formal diplomacy (often referred to as the “Minsk” process, after the city in which the negotiations were held), were not draconian. They were reversible as well as conditional. Following a Russian invasion of Ukraine, new sanctions on banking and on technology transfer would be significant and permanent. They would come in the wake of failed diplomacy and would start at “the top of the ladder,” according to the U.S. administration. In response, Russia will retaliate, quite possibly in the cyber-domain as well as in the energy sector. Moscow will limit access to critical goods such as titanium, of which Russia has been the world’s second-largest exporter. This war of attrition will test both sides. Russia will be ruthless in trying to get one or several European states to back away from economic conflict by linking a relaxation in tension to these countries’ self-interest, thus undermining consensus in the EU and NATO. Europe’s strong suit is its economic leverage. Russia’s asset will be any source of domestic division or disruption in Europe or in Europe’s transatlantic partners. Here Russia will be proactive and opportunistic. If a pro-Russian movement or candidate shows up, that candidate can be encouraged directly or indirectly. If an economic or political sore point diminishes the foreign policy efficacy of the United States and its allies, it will be a weapon for Russian propaganda efforts and for Russian espionage. Much of this is already happening. But a war in Ukraine will up the ante. Russia will use more resources and be unchained in its choice of instruments. The massive refugee flows arriving in Europe will exacerbate the EU’s unresolved refugee policy and provide fertile ground for populists. The holy grail of these informational, political, and cyberbattles will be the 2024 presidential election in the United States. Europe’s future will depend on this election. The election of Donald Trump or of a Trumpian candidate might destroy the transatlantic relationship at Europe’s hour of maximum peril, putting into question NATO’s position and its security guarantees for Europe. Turning NATO Inward For the United States, a Russian victory would have profound effects on its grand strategy in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. First, Russian success in Ukraine would require Washington to pivot to Europe. No ambiguity about NATO’s Article 5 (of the kind experienced under Trump) will be permissible. Only a strong U.S. commitment to European security will prevent Russia from dividing European countries from one another. This will be difficult in light of competing priorities, especially those that confront the United States in a deteriorating relationship with China. But the interests at stake are fundamental. The United States has very large commercial equities in Europe. The European Union and the United States are each other’s largest trade and investment partners, with trade in goods and services totaling $1.1 trillion in 2019. A well-functioning, peaceful Europe augments American foreign policy—on climate change, on nonproliferation, on global public health, and on the management of tensions with China or Russia. If Europe is destabilized, then the United States will be much more alone in the world. NATO is the logical means by which the United States can provide security reassurance to Europe and deter Russia. A war in Ukraine would revive NATO not as a democracy-building enterprise or as a tool for out-of-area expeditions like the war in Afghanistan but as the unsurpassed defensive military alliance that it was designed to be. Although Europeans will be demanding a greater military commitment to Europe from the United States, a broader Russian invasion of Ukraine should drive every NATO member to increase its defense spending. For Europeans, this would be the final call to improve Europe’s defensive capabilities—in tandem with the United States—in order to help the United States manage the Russian-Chinese dilemma. The nuclear superpowers would have to keep their outrage in check. For a Moscow now in permanent confrontation with the West, Beijing could serve as an economic backstop and a partner in opposing U.S. hegemony. In the worst case for U.S. grand strategy, China might be emboldened by Russia’s assertiveness and threaten confrontation over Taiwan. But there is no guarantee that an escalation in Ukraine will benefit the Sino-Russian relationship. China’s ambition to become the central node of the Eurasian economy will be damaged by war in Europe, because of the brutal uncertainties war brings. Chinese irritation with a Russia on the march will not enable a rapprochement between Washington and Beijing, but it may initiate new conversations. The shock of a big military move by Russia will likewise raise questions in Ankara. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey has been enjoying the venerable Cold War game of playing off the superpowers. Yet Turkey has a substantial relationship with Ukraine. As a NATO member, it will not benefit from the militarization of the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. Russian actions that destabilize the wider region could push Turkey back toward the United States, which could in turn drive a wedge between Ankara and Moscow. This would be good for NATO, and it would also open up greater possibilities for a U.S.-Turkish partnership in the Middle East. Rather than a nuisance, Turkey could turn into the ally it is supposed to be. A bitter consequence of a wider war in Ukraine is that Russia and the United States would now encounter each other as enemies in Europe. Yet they will be enemies who cannot afford to take hostilities beyond a certain threshold. However far apart their worldviews, however ideologically opposed, the world’s two most significant nuclear powers will have to keep their outrage in check. This will amount to a fantastically tricky juggling act: a state of economic warfare and geopolitical struggle across the European continent, yet a state of affairs that does not allow escalation to tip into outright war. At the same time, U.S.-Russian confrontation can in the worst case extend to proxy wars in the Middle East or Africa if the United States decides to reestablish its presence after the catastrophic Afghanistan withdrawal. Maintaining communication, especially on strategic stability and cybersecurity, will be crucial. It is notable that U.S.-Russian cooperation on malicious cyber-activities continues even during the current tensions. The necessity of maintaining rigorous arms control agreements will be even greater after a Ukraine war and the sanctions regime that follows it. No Victory is Permanent As the crisis in Ukraine unfolds, the West must not underestimate Russia. It must not bank on narratives inspired by wishful thinking. Russian victory in Ukraine is not science fiction. But if there may be little that the West can do to prevent a Russian military conquest, it will be able to influence what happens afterward. Very often the seeds of trouble lie beneath the veneer of military victory. Russia can eviscerate Ukraine on the battlefield. It can make Ukraine a failed state. But it can do so only by prosecuting a criminal war and by devastating the life of a nation-state that has never invaded Russia. The United States and Europe and their allies and other parts of the world will draw conclusions and be critical of Russian actions. Through their alliances and in their support for the people of Ukraine, the United States and Europe can embody the alternative to wars of aggression and to a might-makes-right ethos. Russian efforts at sowing disorder can be contrasted to Western efforts at restoring order. Much as the United States retained the diplomatic properties of the three Baltic states in Washington, D.C., after they had been annexed by the Soviet Union during World War II, the West can put itself on the side of decency and dignity in this conflict. Wars that are won are never won forever. All too often countries defeat themselves over time by launching and then winning the wrong wars.

При обща численост на СВ между 70 и 80 000 души, вкл. наборниците, украинците и да искат няма как да прикрият всичките си граници, камо ли да изградят пълноценна отбрана. Например, границата се Беларус се прикрива от т.нар. национална гвардия. Затова са решили да използват численото си превъзходство на Донбас като коз, при евентуално/предстоящото руско нападение. Там позициите им са окрепени от 7 години насам. Макар че се повтаря 1 към 1 случая с Армения. Липсват по-сериозни фортификационни работи, все едно, че са застинали по времето на ПСВ. https://t.me/anna_news/20848 Не бих се учудил, ако след време се окаже, че са били отделени много пари за този проблем, но те са се оказали в нечии джоб... Из интернет могат да се срещнат някакви фантастични числа на хиляди танкове, БМП-та и БТР-и на въоръжение в украинските СВ, но и спрямо тази информация съм много скептичен. Пропагандата бълнува за някаква мистична териториална отбрана, т.е. народно опълчение. Но и там положението е много зле от към снабдяване с каквото и да било, а и от към намиране на доброволно пушечно месо. Във ВВС, ПВО и флота положението е още по-зле от към техника.

Ако руснаците не променят локациите на струпване се очертават две главни посоки за настъпление: 1. Между Чернигов и Суми в посока Киев 2. Харков или източно от него в посока удар в гръб на украинската групировка в Донбас. До скоро в Донбас бяха съсредоточени около половината от украинските сухопътни войски. Бързият разгром на тази най-голяма украинска групировка ще означава де факто край на украинската армия. Вероятно руските сили в югоизточен Беларус ще се ползват за обкръжаването на Киев от запад, а войските в югозападен Беларус ще се ползват за овладяването на по-големите градове в западна Украйна, за да не може да се превърнат в центрове на съпротива при смяната на режима в Киев. За Крим мисля, че е писано предостатъчно през годините, така че няма смисъл да се обсъжда.

България е членка на НАТО. Като такава тя може да получи помощ от съюзниците си. Беше й предложена, но отказа с мнимия довод за суверенитет и бла бла. Изобщо не става въпрос за воюване с който и да било, а за ясен външнополитически намек.

Кой ще влиза във война?

В новият световен икономически ред единствено Европа все още не е подчинена напълно на Китай. Вижда се къде са сегашните военни сили САЩ и Русия на графиката. Не случайно "Един път, един пояс" е създаден, за да свърже ЕС с КНР. Като се замисля, дори долара ако престане да е световната резервна валута и САЩ ги хване липсата, еврозоната ще си е все така икономическа супер сила. А на пътя им ще стоят само Русия и Индия. Ако сте запознат с външната политика на ЕС, ще видите, че тя е предсказуема, щедра и рядко е конфронтационна. Това прави Европа предпочитан партньор за Китай, и не случайно китайците изляха сериозни пари в най-пострадалите страни от дълговата криза, за да стабилизират Съюза.

Това е много силна критика от китайска страна, в типично техен стил - не назовават директно към кого, но то е ясно, и то отправена не къде да е, а точно в най-големия западен форум за сигурност и външна политика. ----- Не желая да разводнявам повече тази тема с офтопик за Украйна, само ще отбележа, че според мен след обявяването на мобилизацията от проруските сили, трудно ще има връщане назад. Именно. Кивропа, като на ЕС й е отдадено почетното място да бъде голям китайски пазар.

Все пак сме цивилизовани участници в интернет форум и това е ролята на дискусиите - да се обменят различни мнения. Колкото по-добре аргументирани, толкова по-добре. Да, за това и написах, че за руснаците предстоящата война с Украйна е война за самоеманципация като глобална сила. Дали ще им се получи обаче, само времето ще покаже. Новият ред е неизбежен, само че Караганов и ко. как си ги представят тия неща, че Русия е равностойна на Китай?! China foreign minister says Minsk Agreement 'only way out' on Ukraine Feb 19 (Reuters) - Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on Saturday called the Minsk Agreement the "only way out" for resolving the Ukraine situation, and said Ukraine should not be a frontline for competition among major powers. Speaking to a security conference via videolink, Wang said all parties should sit down to have in-depth discussion, and come up with a road map and timetable for implementation of the Minsk Agreement. The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of any country should be respected and safeguarded, Wang said. ----- След като Си е изкарал Ван да каже такива неща, значи в Пекин са много ядосани, че не изчакаха края на Олимпиадата. И не само това. Преди руската анексия на Крим китайците бяха сред големите потребители на военна продукция от Украйна. Или пък това изказване е част от усилията на КНР да създаде cordon sanitaire по границите на Русия. Само българските рубладжии да не разберат, че има и такова нещо в китайския проект, че съвсем ще изгубят усет за реалността. https://www.24chasa.bg/novini/article/10922150

Това е само върха на айсберга. Единствената разлика между нас и тях е, че при нас обществото ни е изпаднало в латентен милитаризъм, докато при тях дрънкането на оръжие си е все така най-важното нещо.

В продължение на горния пост. От години руската пропаганда представя световния ред като борба между САЩ и съюза между Китай и Русия, което съвсем не е така. Както един от руските наблюдатели правилно отбелязва, Китай няма да рискува собственото си икономическо благополучие, за да спасява руснаците от техните имперски провали. Например, китайците продължават да си мълчат за случващото се с Украйна след Майдана, но преди 2014 те бяха голям инвеститор и планираха да прекарат "Един път, един пояс" през... Крим. Китайските комунисти, за разлика от "българските", имат чувство за принадлежност към своят народ и твърдо защитават интересите му. Техните интереси, не са интересите на путинистите и олигархичната клика около него. Китай е този, който разполага с огромен икономически и научен потенциал, а руснаците паразитират върху природни ресурси на завладените през последните 3 века земи. Наистина няма място за сравнение и китайците това го знаят прекрасно - в отношенията Пекин-Москва китайците са в силната позиция, докато руснаците се умилкват за някой друг юан. В този ред на мисли, от китайски интерес е Русия да е все така икономически слаба и демографски изчезваща. За КНР не е от интерес руснаците да са силни военно и икономически. Нека помислим какво ги вълнува китайските интереси. В едно средносрочно бъдеще САЩ ще продължат да са най-големия китайски търговски партньор. И пак тогава САЩ ще са изтеглили от Източна Азия и няма да представляват абсолютно никакъв стратегически противник. Докато Русия ще си е все така на северната граница, все така агресивна и непредвидима, защото е в по-слаба позиция от Китай. Отново да попитам, за какво им е на китайските комунисти да се жертват за руските интереси или пък още повече, да направят Русия по-силна от сега?! ----- Ако китайците ще преправят световната финансова система и от долар нефта ще минава на е-юан, дали е в руски интерес всичко това?! Защото това е най-прекия път към превъплащаването на анекдота за Нигерия на севера с ядрено оръжие в реалност.

Явно мобилизацията не е само в Донбас, но е обхванала и Кубан.

Съгласен съм с повечето от написаното/казаното от наблюдателите и подчертаното от вас. Няма как да не се съглася! Всички са наясно, че единственото крепящо отношенията между Русия и Китай е противопоставянето срещу САЩ, т.е. наличието на общ враг. Ако се стигне до момент, в който в Москва и/или Пекин американците вече не са възприемани като заплаха, естествено ще се обърнат един срещу друг. Наскоро попаднах на нова, за мен, теория в международните отношения - нападателния реализъм. Склонен съм да мисля, че външната политика на Русия след Мюнхенската реч на Путин следва именно нейния път. Не по друга причина, ами просто, защото руснаците нямат алтернатива. От запад настъпва богатите, добре развити западни страни, предлагащи някакво бъдеще за обикновения човек. На изток отново набира скорост старата сила Китай, която за два века бе унижавана и разделяна от външни фактори. Следователно за руснаците няма друг изход освен да започнат да хапят и късат където и от когото могат, иначе съвсем ща са между чука и наковалнята. Затова виждаме намесата на руснаците в конфликти като Либия, ЦАР, Мали и пр. дестинации, които са периферни, защото руснаците имат сили само за толкова. Единствените изключения са Сирия и Украйна. В сирийския конфликт засега спечелиха руснаците, а в украинския ще видим кой. Пишейки за Русия няма как да не се отделят няколко реда за Украйна. Украинските земи имат едно единствено значение за Москва - те са преходни към Централна Европа. През Украйна минава и сухопътната връзка към Босфора, т.е. ако руснаците възнамеряват да установяват контрол над страните от бившия ОВД Украйна им е важна. За приказките за американски ракети край Харков няма смисъл да си губим времето в оборване на кухи опорки. Забалежете, че пиша за конфликти случващи се в посока запад, югозапад от Москва, но нищо за изток. Именно в Далечния Изток руснаците са най-слаби. Както един от коментиращите споменава, руските земи са слабо заселени. Т.е. липсват естествени урбанистични центрове, които да генерират икономически просперитет и да служат като опорен пункт за външнополитическо влияние. Владивосток с неговото населенийце не впечатляват никого в региона. За китайските, японските и корейските стандарти това е второразряден, че и треторазряден град. Същото важи и за руската гордост - Харбин. Какво е Харбин в лицето на средностатистическия китаец, ако изобщо е чувал, че има такъв град. Та, предстоящата война за Украйна, ще е война и за самоеманципацията на Русия. С всичките геополитически последици. Това ще разтърси Балканите, защото освен Турция и Сърбия, България и Унгария също дават все по-ясни сигнали, че искат да са субекти. Ще разтърси Кавказ, ще разтърси и Средна Азия. Това са регионите по руската периферия, върху които Русия може да оказва влияние. И през всеки един от тези три региона преминава поне един лъч на Южното разклонение на "Един път, един пояс". Да, китайците са доволни, че руснаците отвличат вниманието на САЩ и ЕС, но това ще е краткотрайно явление. Докато китайските планове за алтернативен, независещ от Русия, търговски коридор до ЕС, ще се провалят. Освен, ако в Средна Азия не се постави кондоминиум.

Никой не познава руснаците така, както ние. Украинците и беларусите даже не ги броя за отделни. От всички натовски страни в региона само ние заехме превантивна позиция на снишаване. Защо ли така изведнъж България взе да се дърпа на всякакви намеци за западни войски тук?!

Предвид че проруските сили са обявили всеобща мобилизация, вероятно така и ще се случи.

Малко новини от днес. Вече открито се стрелят в Донбас. Евакуират се всички жени, деца и възрастни. Само на мъжете на възраст между 18 и 55 е забранено да бягат. Проруските сили открито се готвят за бойни действия. https://t.me/voynareal/8002 Да напомня, че до края на Олимпиядата остават 4 дни.

Из интернет пишат, че след края на Олимпиядата Си ще излезе с програмна реч, която ще очертае виждането на Китай за нов многополярен международен ред. Като нищо ще включат в новия ред и е-юана.

Явно Китай е на път да създава историята отново. Както пръв въведе хартиените пари, сега ще стори същото с дигиталните.