Nike

Е, най-накрая си намерих аватарче, което да ми харесва достатъчно, че да не го сменям в близко бъдеще...

Да, на български, но с латиница, защото някои части (само някои, като заглавия на съобщения, имена на провинции и т.н.) не излизат на кирилица (а като звездички). А Glory of the Roman Empire ще я потърся. Казваш, че не е зле?

Дачо, линка, който съм дал е към темата, в която съм обяснил как да се инсталира и т.н. Предпочетох да не давам директен линк към архива с превода, защото след известно време най-вероятно ще бъде автоматично изтрит оттам, където съм го качвал. Но все пак: Линк-1 и Линк-2 (файловете са еднакви, но на два различни сайта). Но, както съм казал и в темата там, превода не е завършен - в момента доизкусурявам проблемите с кирилицата (по-точно - гледам къде не я разчита и заменям, за съжаление, с латиница), а дипломатичните съобщения пък изобщо не съм ги пипал - твърде големи са като обем, а сега нямам много време за преводи. Но поне е нещо... И, впрочем, все пак ти препоръчвам да прегледаш тамошната тема! Между другото, каква е тази Glory of the Roman Empire? На Haemimont Games ли? Не знаех, че е излязла...

Хаха, харесва ми историята на Сийланд! И то доста! Дачо, то само парите да бяха! Но коя държава би се съгласила да даде безвъзмездно част от територията си за създаване на нова държава? Иначе парите по-лесно можем да ги съберем...

Главно стратегии. В момента играя българската игра Knights of Honor (всъщност я превеждам, де), но очаквам и M:TW2. За съжаление, по принцип нямам почти никакво време и възможности за компютърни игри, поне през последната една година...

Няма лошо! Един приятел пък иска да си направи "средновековно" царство в някой по затънтен район на Швеция. Ех, да съберем пари...

Златен кинжал и още 545 предмета откриха археолози в Карловско Новооткритото златно съкровище от третото хилядолетие преди Христа ще бъде показано от 9 август в Националния исторически музей 06.08.2006 Аргеолози намериха 545 златни украшения и кинжал от златна сплав от третото хилядолетие преди Христа в могила край село Дъбене, Карловско. Откритието направил научния сътрудник в Националния исторически музей Мартин Христов. Златното находище край Дъбене беше открито преди две години и в него продължават да намират нови предмети. През 2005 г. са били открити 15 500 златни елемента, които вече са показвани на изложби в Италия и Дания, а в момента част от тях са включени в голямата изложба на тракийското злато във Варна. Новата сензация от Дъбене е идеално запазеният кинжал, който не завършва с остър връх, а със заточена равна част и е с високо съдържание на злато в сплавта. Кинжалът няма утилитарни функции, а е по-скоро символ на царска или на първожреческа власт. Освен високата си художествена стойност той е свидетелство за високо организиран живот на праисторическото общество в карловското поле преди пет хиляди години и образуването на първите раннокласови държавни формации, коментират от националния музей. Огромният брой златни предмети говори за интензивен добив на злато и за високи технологии при обработката на метала. Находки от този тип в Средна и Южна Европа са съвсем малко. Изводът на учените е, че център, снабдяващ цяла Европа със златни украшения, се е намирал в карловското поле, каза пред журналисти директорът на НИМ Божидар Димитров. Но пълна загадка остава естеството на находището. Хилядите златни фрагменти са в десетки малки могилки, но в тях липсват човешки кости и керамика, т.е. няма погребения. Не са и останки от опожарени работилници, както се мислеше първоначално, тъй като липсват следи от сгради и пожари. На терена няма следи от селище от тази епоха - то се намира на километри от мястото на златното съкровище. Налага се тезата, че предметите са полагани в земята в рамките на ритуал като дарове за неизвестен бог. Новите открития ще бъдат изложени в Националния исторически музей на 9 август, тъй като не се нуждаят от специална консервация. Нетинфо

Израел и Либия? Там пък сега какво е станало?

Цялата компилация е качена и на торент в data.bg...

Същият го използвах във форума на Хановете... А моя дори и не знам кой е. Във всеки форум използвам различни аватари и нито един не ми допада достатъчно (но пък и не ми се сменят)...

From “Varlaam and Joasaph” Notes about the stories from the book “From the Old Bulgarian Literature” Varlaam and Joasaph – widely spread medieval short novel, in the basis of which lies the legend of Buda, completely Christianized. The two published stories are only a part of the short novel – two parables, through which the hermit Varlaam shows to Joasaph, son of the Indian heathen king Avenir, the power of the Christian religion. Disguised as a merchant, Varlaam tells him a whole number of parables, which are differentiated as self-dependent stories. The short novel has made its way into Bulgaria probably in the XI c. – The texts of the stories are taken from the book of Jord. Ivanov “Old-Bulgarian stories”, 1935. “Parable for the unicorn” All these, says Varlaam, who serve the mean and evil master – the world, - who in their madness shun the good and man-loving God, who have given themselves wholly to the earthly things and the pleasures of flesh, but have abandoned their souls in spiritual hunger and countless evils, such people are like the one, who fled from the face of the one-horned beast. As he couldn’t endure its voice and its foul cry, he ran as much as he could, so that he wouldn’t be eaten, and he fell in the great abyss. As he fell with stretched arms, he caught a tree and he caught it fast; and as he placed his feet at one bulge, he thought that he is now in absolute safety. But as he looked, he saw two mice, one white and the other black, which were gnawing the root of the tree, which he had caught, and there was not much time till they would gnaw it through and root it out. And when he looked around and to the bottom of the abyss, he saw a fearful dragon with a fiery breath, fixing its gaze upwards and opening its mouth, waiting to devour him. He looked then to his feet and he saw four snake heads, which were reaching out of the bulge on which he had placed his feet. Then, as he raised his eyes, he noticed that from the tree, on which he was hanging, some honey is dropping. Then he forgot the troubles, which surrounded him, he forgot that there’s an open-mouthed dragon in the abyss, waiting to devour him; that the tree on which he was hanging is soon to be rooted out; that his feet are standing on slippery and unstable ground. He didn’t think about these so abominable horrors, but he was carried away by the sweetness of few drops of honey. This is the picture of those, who are deceived by the spirit of today’s life; I will explain it to you now. The unicorn is the image of the death, which constantly pursues the offspring of Adam. The abyss is this world, filled with all kinds of evils and deadly consequences. The tree, which the two mice are constantly gnawing and which we have caught and are hanging on, is the road of life of every man, being gradually shortening and coming near its end, just as the hours of the day (the white) and the night (the black mouse) are slipping by. The four snakes signify the deceitful and transient parts of which the human body is made and which, if they come into disagreement and disorder, bring disorder to the body itself. Besides this, that fiery and fierce dragon signifies the terrible hellish womb, which is hungry to devour those, who prefer the worldly pleasures instead of the goods of the future. And the honey drop represents the sweetness of the worldly pleasures, through which the world seduces the lovers of pleasures and doesn’t let them take care for their own salvation. “Parable for the three friends” One man had three friends: two of them he honoured sincerely and cared much about their love; the third one he treated coldly. Once the king’s messengers, fearful soldiers, came to him and wanted to take him to the king, because he had done some wrong. This deeply saddened him and he decided to look for a helpmate, who would intercede for him in front of his lord. He hurried up to his first friend and he told him: “You know, friend, that I’ve always loved you and I’ve given my soul for you. Now I need a helper, who would rescue me from trouble. And thus, intercede for me before the king, of whom I’m too worried.” He answered him: “I am not your friend, nor I know who you are or where you are from; I have others with which I keep close friendship. But here, I give you two tatters, take them and carry them with you, wherever you go, but don’t expect something else from me”. As he understood that there would be no help from him, he hurried up to his second close friend and he told him: “Do you know, friend, what favour I’ve had for you; now, however, I fell in great sadness; and so, help me to save myself from it.” Then his second friend replied to him: “I am myself in worries and I don’t have time to stay long with you; I will go out for awhile to accompany you to a certain distance and I will go back, because I’m busy with my own hardships and I will not be able to help you.” Deeply saddened by the ungratefulness of his friends, to which he showed so much love, he went to the third one, whom he had never loved, nor he had ever shared good hours with him, and started talking to him with shame and humiliation: “You know, friend, that I have never showed a special love to you, but now, as an ill plague has befallen me and none of my other friends, with which I kept close friendship in vain, didn’t help me, I came to you to ask you, if you could, to help me at least a bit. Don’t chase me away because of my imprudence!” And he answered him kindly and with a mirthful face: “I remember your small favours to me and because of that I’ll help you. Don’t be saddened, because I’ll go to the king before you and will beseech him not to deliver you in the hands of your enemies. Be brave, friend, don’t be sorrow!” Then the debtor started talking with tears in his eyes: “Woe me, should I first rejoice or grieve? Should I blame myself that I had a friendship with those, the deceitful friends, or should I suffer that to this sincere friend I haven’t shown any love?” Joasaph listened with astonishment to the parable and asked that it would be explained to him, to which Varlaam replied: “The first friend are the maleficent riches, for which the man falls in bad sins. When the death comes, the riches can’t help with anything, except with a cloth for the burial, but even for that there would be rumours. The second friend are the wife, the children and the other relatives, which have lived for some time with him, but they can’t help him with anything; even if they accompany him to the grave, they return again to take care of their own hardships and sins. The third one, he is eternal and stable friend. His name is: faith, love, peace, alms, kindness, obedience, helpfulness, tractability, sobriety, prayer, fasting, repentance and so on. He is the good friend, who remembers even the smallest good turns and redeems the man from the eternal torment”.

Е, поне няма мои... Засега... Warlord, ако се добереш до още такива обнадеждаващи ме примери, постни ги тук! А тези аз ще си ги запиша и на компютъра да си ги чета за развеселяване...

Уфф, цял ден се мъча да кача общия архивиран файл с картите, но все нещо се прецаква. Ако някой има по-добра скорост на ъплоуд, може да дръпне раздробената компилация, да я събере и да я ъплоудне наново. Нещата са същите, но просто ги разделих на три файла, за да мога въобще да ги кача... Част-1 Част-2 Част-3

В момента ги качвам тук, но скоростта ми на ъплоуд е малко бавна (а файла е над 30МБ) и ще са готови след час...

FOR THE QUESTION OF THE BULGARIAN MILITARY MIGHT IN THE LAST QUARTER OF THE X AND THE BEGINNING OF THE XI CENTURY. WHY DID BULGARIA LOSE THE DUEL WITH BYZANTIUM? Ivelin Ivanov A brief annotation At the beginning of the 11th century, after decades of almost incessant wars with the Byzantine Empire, the Bulgarian state lost its political independence. In many research works on the period in question there is emphasis put on the stabilization of the Empire at the end of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th century as a major factor or a reason for the loss of our political independence for a century and a half. Of course together with this also go the internal political state of the Bulgarian kingdom and the decline in its military power, which made it easier for Emperor Basil II to put pressure on the Bulgarians. This article considers the issue of the reasons that caused the decline in the Bulgarian military power at the end of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th century, the changes in the military stratagems observed in the wars of tzar Samuil and his successors to the throne. Why did Samuil avoid major battles in the open? Why do the sources speak mostly about lightly-equipped Bulgarian armies? Why did the Bulgarians of this time take over fortresses after prolonged sieges and mainly through starvation and military stratagems? The current article attempts to give an answer to these questions based on the written sources of the period and the works of historians. The topic of the present article is represented in our historiography from the beginning of the XIX century to the modern days, whereas many and different answers of the given problem exist.1 From one side, as a reason for the fall of the Western Bulgarian tsardom, the might of Byzantium and the person of Basil II are being pointed out, i.e. the external factor for the collapse of the Bulgarian statehood, while Samuil's reign and his wars with Byzantium are shown as a heroic epic, as a huge military effort, which however doesn't succeed in stopping the Byzantine pressure. Truly the external factor or the military and political stabilization of Byzantium in the end of the X and the beginning of the XI century is a main factor for the outcome of the Bulgarian-Byzantine duel, but in a parallel with this and quite equally in value, as a reason for the defeat we could point out also the military weakness of the Western Bulgarian tsardom. Which are the main preconditions and displays of this military weakness? The manner of warfare, the military strategy and the tactics of the Bulgarian forces in the period VII – the beginning of IX century are partly known from the sources and widely presented in the modern historiography. The biggest, decisive and victorious battles in the period VII – middle of X century were achieved in open battle, through wide use of stratagems and ambushes, sometimes in big night fights, but were almost always connected with the wide use of the cavalry, which was taking the main burden, inflicting the decisive strike and finishing the battle by undertaking a pursuit. The main prerequisites for accepting decisive fights were several. On first place, this was the mainly equestrain composition of the Bulgarian army, a part of which was armed with heavy defensive and offensive armament. We draw information about this from the armament inscriptions, which were preserved to these days, in which except for chain mails and helmets it's also mentioned about ring-mails for the horses, and this gives a basis for a presumption that a part of the Bulgar cavalry was entirely heavily armed and represented the main shock core, whose purpose was a powerful frontal or flanking strike against well armed infantry or cavalry in an open battle. Unfortunately we don't have precise written reports for the numbers of the heavily armed cavalry, except for one report from the sources that in the winter of 811-812 Khan Krum operated in Thrace with a cavalry of 30 000 men, all dressed in iron, i.e. heavily armed (Pseudo-Simeon 1964: 172).2 Based on the records from the preserved to our days armament inscriptions from the region of Pliska, Preslav, Madara, Shabla and other places in North-Eastern Bulgaria, we could make one generalized calculation for defensive armament, intended for 1 713 horsemen (Venedikov 1979: 53-54). If we accept conditionally that the preserved to our days inscriptions of this kind are not more than one tenth of the existing from that time, then we'll reach the number 17 130 horsemen and that only in the so called inner region. If we compare this with the report for the 30 000 strong army of Khan Krum, then we could accept that the numbers of the heavily armed cavalry in the Bulgarian army varied between 17-20 000 to 30 000, depending on the mobilization tension and the number of the allied or mercenary detachments. On the basis of the previously exposed arguments and on the statement that the maximal mobilization ability of the Bulgars was around 20%, we could assume that in the beginning of the IX century the numbers of the Bulgars was in the limits between 100 000 and 150 000 people (Ketskarov 1940: 81).3 [Tr.n.: Of course, all these calculations are mainly hypothetical and not absolute proofs] The considerably small numbers of the equestrain Bulgarian army compared to the military contingents of Byzantium was compensated by its greater mobility, possibility for fast movement and the good armament. The Bulgarian military victories in the period VII - beginning of X century were due not to numerical superiority, but to good strategy and tactics of warfare. Despite this, after the great military successes of Tsar Simeon a stillness appeared, and later even a collapse of the Bulgarian military might. What were the main reasons for this change? In the period of Tsar Petar's reign (927-969) the already begun devastating Magyar incursions were a clear indicator for a decline of its military might. As Emperor Leo VI Philosopher writes in his Tactics, the manner of warfare of the Magyars and the Bulgarians was close, so we have no reason to claim that the Magyars and their way of fighting wasn't familiar (Leo VI Philosopher 1961: 168). Because we have no concrete reports or descriptions of battles between Bulgarians and Magyars, we can only presume that the Magyar raids were fought back only with the military forces of the frontier governors, which proved insufficient. The next military trial was the invasion of the Varangians of Kniaz Svetoslav in 969, which was aimed against the best organized and battle-efficient territory - the inner region of the state and which confirmed the tendency of decline of the Bulgarian military might. The fights ended with a defeat for the Bulgarians, who didn't manage to resist the heavy Russian infantry (Leo VI Philosopher 1961: 171).4 If we trust the reports from the sources, Svetoslav conquered 80 fortresses along the Danube and this gives us an indirect information that the Bulgarians already relied not so much on the army and the open battles rather on the system of fortresses and the garrisons in them. Concerning the density of the castle network in the North-Eastern Bulgarian lands we can also judge from other written reports, because in 971, during the siege of Svetoslav in Drastar by John Tzimiskes, messengers from many Bulgarian fortresses arrived, which attested their allied relations and obedience (Skilitsa-Kedrin 1965: 268). With the exception of the invasions of Magyars and Pechenegs, Tsar Petar led a continuous peaceful policy for four decades and without any doubt this prolonged period limited the military experience and hardness. Whatever the preconditions for the occured military weakness were, in the long run it proved to be the main reason for the occupation of Northern and North-Eastern Bulgaria by Emperor John Tzimiskes, who relied upon the fortress garrisons. (Bozhilov 1979: 122).5 The next period in our historical development brought at the front the sons of komit Nikola, which managed to keep the independence of the Western and South-Western Bulgarian lands, while the new conditions brought essential changes in the strategy and tactics of warfare of the Bulgarians. One of the main changes in the Bulgarian military mastery from the previous stage was the change in the sieging tactics of the Bulgarians. Indicative in this respect are several moments from Samuil's wars. In the siege of Larissa, which was of key importance for the rule of Tessaly and for penetration to the south into real Greece, Samuil lost three years and the fortress was taken not with an assault, but with a prolonged siege and starvation (Kekavmen 1968: 23; Angelov, Cholpanov 1994: 38). In the siege of the Servia fortress a stratagem was used again, with which this time the Bulgarians captured the commandant of Servia and thus the city was captured in 989 (Skilitsa-Kedrin 1965: 281). On the next place, in their campaing in 998 towards the Adriatic coast, despite of the many attempts, the Bulgarian forces managed to capture only the city of Kataro (Duklia presbyter 1967: 174). One of the most important and strategic castles in Western Bulgaria was Drach [Dyrrachion], but it also, according to the most of the historians, was captured not with assault and siege, but with a diplomatic way and thanks to the fact that the duke of the city - John Hrisilius, was father-in-law of Samuil (Zlatarski 1994: 680). Most probably, despite of some incomplete reports for the use of siege equipment, the komitopuls and concretely Samuil didn't have heavy siege equipment, without which the capturing of strong fortresses would be impossible. As a result for this absence the Bulgarian forces and Samuil developed and executed to perfection the tactics of surprise, starvation and ambushes in their attacks against strong castles. The information from the sources shows that Samuil applied tactics of sudden attacks and bringing the enemy out of the fortress walls, as the decisive battle was given in a previously chosen and prepared with ambuscades place (Skilitsa-Kedrin 1965: 278, 285, 288). We find here a second characteristical feature in the warfare tactics of the Bulgarians in this period. In a careful look into the reports of the written sources our attention stops on the frequent mentioning of the ambush or series of ambushes as a main feature of the tactics. Of course, the ambush was a characteristic part of the traditional Bulgarian tactic and was applied frequently in the wars from the period VII - beginning of X century, but after 971 it takes greater and greater place in the manner of fighting and appears most frequently to be the reason for the enemy's defeat. It was applied often in castle attacks, in pursuits and a search for general engagement and was the most used tactical manner in the period of defence from the beginning of XI century. The reasons for these changes in the manner of warfare were undoubtedly connected with the objective conditions and the changed situation after the occupation of Northern and North-Eastern Bulgaria and more precisely and most probably with the character and composition of the Bulgarian forces. For the description of Samuil's warriors the sources sometimes mention horsemen and equestrain detachments, but the question is what was this cavalry and did it compose a major or large part of the forces? I think that we could search for a satisfying answer only on the basis of indirect reports. In the period from 971 to the end of X century the sources speak for active military actions and quick raids of the Bulgarian forces in Tessaly, towards Solun [Thessaloniki] and in real Greece. For one of these campaigns - the one in Tessaly from 978, we have concrete information for the use of cavalry and infantry, as we presume that the cavalry was lightly armed (Zlatarski 1994: 660). In the pursuit from the retreating from Sredets Basil II in 986 the Bulgarian forces managed to move very fast and to await the Byzantine army in an ambush (Leo Deacon 1964: 275-276; Balaschev 1929: 66). This, in line with the fact that the Armenian guard of the emperor, undoubtedly heavily armed, managed to break their way through the Bulgarians and to come out in an open field, gives reasons to presume that the Bulgarian forces, which crushed Basil II in 986, consisted mainly of lightly armed infantry and supposedly also of the same cavalry. In the same time we do not deny the existence also of heavily armed units in the Bulgarian army from this time, but their numbers were obviously very limited. Some reports from the sources speak directly for the participation of such in one battle from 1017, when the Byzantines took captive 200 heavily armed warriors (maybe horsemen), but these heavily armed contingents, as we could suggest from the last number, were a small part of the whole army, which in its mass was lightly armed and exactly this imposed changes in the tactics of warfare (Skilitsa-Kedrin 1965: 290). But let us go back again to the end of X century, when after the defeat near the Sparhei River, despite of the successful campaign along the Dalmatian coast and against the Serbs and of his coronation as tsar in 997, Samuil dealt harder and harder with the increasing Byzantine pressure. When in 997 magister Nikifor Uranus entered the Bulgarian realms and started plundering them, the Bulgarians didn't oppose him, but relying on their strong fortresses, awaited the turn of even (Skilitsa-Kedrin 1965: 283). One of the reasons for this were probably the consequences of the defeat at Sparhei, but many of the historians believe that it didn't have a fatal reflection on the Bulgarian military might and I'm prone to support this opinion. The campaign of Samuil to the west and north-west in 998 proved that he still has enough numbers of forces, but the campaign of Nikifor Uranus in the previous 997 was indicative in another relation: although enough in numbers, the mass of the Bulgarian army could not resist the well trained and armed Byzantine infantry and cavalry. I think that Samuil realized this and expecting the heavy fight, hurried to strenghten his rear. The next period, spanning from 1000 till 1018, clearly shows the consequences of the fundamental changes in the military tactics of the Bulgarians and its infelicity against the pressure from the regular Byzantine units. The main conclusion, which Basil II made from the military actions against the Bulgarians was that they can't be broken with only one powerful and decisive campaign and that he should apply against Samuil a methodic and constant pressure with gradual gaining of control over key places and fortresses. The first step in applying this strategy was the conquering of Northern Bulgaria and of the strategic fortresses Serdica, Bdin and Skopie. Realizing these main goals in his campaigns in 1000-1003, Basil II managed to concentrate his forces to the west, against Samuil. With these successes the strategic initiative went to the side of Byzantium and in this second stage the Bulgarians were forces to turn to active defence, because accepting a general battle on an open field was a certain suicide. Samuil relied on the tenacious defence of fortresses and surprizing raids deep into Byzantine territory, like the one against Odrin [Adrianople] in 1002, but the unfavourable progress of the military actions soon forced a change in this strategy (Angelov, Cholpanov 1994: 52). The key Bulgarian strongholds, although heavily fortified, hardly resisted to prolonged sieges and in one relatively short period Basil II succeeded in capturing Bdin, Skopie, Sredets and the big fortresses in Northern Bulgaria. Samuil couldn't unblock these important for him castles and the reasons for this were most probably the numbers of his forces, as well as their lighter armament, while the Byzantine emperor never again repeated his mistake from 986 (Angelov, Cholpanov 1994: 52). Due to the fact that the Byzantine forces had surrounded his realms in an arc from the south-east, east and north-east and ravaged the heart of Western Bulgaria, the Bulgarian tsar decided to pull out his defence and, as the Byzantine chroniclers say, started blocking key places and passages, through which the Romean forces invaded (Angelov, Cholpanov 1994: 54-55). Unfortunately, these actions were doomed to failure and the defeat at Kliuch is quite indicative. The big numbers of captives, which according to the sources are 14 000 or 15 000, suggest that the rout was quick and the surrender to captivity - massive, and from here we could suggest that these forces were without enough battle experience or with weak armament. The applied by the next Tsar Gavril Radomir (1014-1015) strategy and tactics reminds of Samuil's one and was based mainly on guerilla warfare and defence of key fortresses. In his short reign the son of Tsar Samuil didn't manage to turn the process of military decline and was forced to follow the pressing actions of fortification and defence. The next ruler Tsar Ivan Vladislav (1015-1018) was obviously an active and warlike person, but despite of the efforts to draw the Pechenegs and for combined actions with Krakra, Basil II continued his successful invading policy (Skilitsa-Kedrin 1965: 288-289). Tsar Ivan Vladislav tried to realize a strategic change by forcing the Romeans to fight on two fronts and attempted to draw the Pechenegs, and on second place he tried to fill the dangerous gap in the rear, which was done with the turn over of the Drach [Dyrrachion] fortress by Samuil's son-in-law - Ashot, to the Byzantines (Skilitsa-Kedrin 1965: 279). The tsar died in the siege of this city and with his death the beginning of the full military and political end of the First Bulgarian Tsardom started. After all this logically comes the question of what are the main reasons for the changes in the strategy and tactics of the military actions of the Bulgarians in the events after 971. According to some authors, the main reason for Byzantium's successes are based on the fact that the komitopuls didn't manage to restore the attacking equestrain detachment, which the Bulgarian khans and later Tsar Simeon had.6 They believe that the Bulgarians lost their heavily armed cavalry and infantry as a result of Svetoslav's campaigns and mostly after the slaughter of 300 Bulgarian bolyars [Tr.n.: nobles] by the Russes in Drastar, in whose hands at this time was the military organization of the Bulgarian state. According to Balaschev the armament and the manner of warfare of Samuil's forces was purely South-Slavic and this was the main difference from the previous period (Balaschev 1929:15-16,67). I think that these reasonings are right only partially and that not the slaughter of the 300 bolyars, not the human losses in Svetoslav's campaigns, but the occupation of Eastern Bulgaria and the inner region by Byzantium and the transfer of the political centre to the West led to fundamental changes in the military art of the Bulgarians. Analysing archaeological and written records, we could accept that the main, heavily-armed power of the Bulgarian army was being drawn exactly from the territories of the inner region or North-Eastern Bulgaria, where the stores with the heavy defensive armament were concentrated, and their loss played a fatal role in the following fate of the Bulgarian state (Bertin annals 1960: 287; Venedikov 1979: 52-55). The military-strategic importance of the eastern Bulgarian lands is confirmed also by the actions of Basil II in the very beginning of the XI century. The new capturing of Northern and North-Eastern Bulgaria after 1000-1001 predetermined the result of the Bulgarian-Byzantine duel. Probably these processes and events coincided with the decline of the traditional military-mobilization system of the Bulgarians, as this process most probably passed with a special intensity during the reign of Tsar Petar and was a direct result of the processes of feudalization and increasing social stratification, but this requires additional research on the complex changes in the Bulgarians society, which started already by Khan Krum and passed with accelerated temps after the conversion to Christianity. NOTES: 1. The period after the fall of Eastern Bulgaria under Byzantine rule in 971 and the reasons for the fall under Byzantine rule are thoroughly examined in the following works: Златарски, В. История на българската държава през средните векове. Т. 1. Ч. 2. София, 1994. [Zlatarski, V. "History of the Bulgarian state in the middle ages", vol.1, Part 2, Sofia, 1994]; Баласчевь, Г. Българить презъ последнить десетгодишнини на десетия вькъ. Ч. 2. София, 1929. [balaschev, G. "The Bulgarians in the last decades of the tenth century", Part 2, Sofia, 1929]; Кецкаров, В. Войни на българить въ Тракия 689-972. София, 1940 [Ketskarov, V. "Wars of the Bulgarians in Thrace 689-972", Sofia, 1940]; Ангелов, Д., Чолпанов, Д. Българска военна история през Средновековието (X-XV век). София, 1994 [Angelov, D., Cholpanov, D. "Bulgarian military history in the middle ages (X-XV century)”, Sofia, 1994]; Венедиков, И. Военното и административното устройство на България през IX и X век. София, 1979 [Venedikov, I. “The military and administrative organization of Bulgaria during IX and X century”, Sofia, 1979]; Божилов, И. Анонимът на Хазе. България и Византия на долни Дунав в края на X век. София, 1979 [bozhilov, I. “The anonym of Haze. Bulgaria and Byzantium on the lower Danube in the end of X century”, Sofia, 1979] and others. 2. In the source the following is mentioned: “...By the way, when good days came in the winter and the rivers hadn’t much water, the Bulgarians came out with a 30 000 strong army, all dressed in iron...” 3. The author suggests that the mobilization capability of the Bulgarians during IX-X century was around 15-20% and on the basis of this and of the information, which Venedikov gives, I base my assumptions for the numbers of the Bulgars. 4. In his Tactics Leo VI Philosopher notes that especially effective against the barbarian cavalry is the heavy infantry and gives advices for the use of well trained infantry against the Magyar horsemen. Obviously in the same logic the well trained and heavily armed with chain mails, helmets, swords and battle axes Russian infantry proved to be an irresistible barrier against the Bulgarian cavalry and infantry. 5. The author believes that the Byzantine power on the lower Danube was thrown off not later than the summer of 990 and the Bulgarian rule there was restored until the campaing of Emperor Basil II in 1000. 6. This opinion is supported by Balaschev and many other authors, which believe that exactly the lack of heavy cavalry led to the fall of the Western Bulgarian Tsardom under Byzantine rule. BIBLIOGRAPHY: Ангелов, Чолпанов 1994: Ангелов, Д., Чолпанов, Д. Българска военна история през Средновековието (X-XV век). София, 1994. Angelov, Chopanov 1994: Angelov, D., Cholpanov, D. “Bulgarian military history in the middle ages (X-XV century)”, Sofia, 1994 Баласчев 1929: Баласчевь, Г. Българить презъ последнить десетгодишнини на десетия вькъ. Ч. 2. София, 1929. Balaschev 1929: Balaschev, G. “The Bulgarians in the last decades of the tenth century”, Part 2, Sofia, 1929 Бертински анали 1960: Бертински анали. // Латински извори за българската история (ЛИБИ). Т. 2. София,1960. Bertin annals 1960: Bertin annals. // Latin sources for the Bulgarian history (LSBH), vol. 2, Sofia 1960 Бешевлиев 1987: Бешевлиев, В. Прабългарските надписи. София, 1987. Beshevliev 1987: Beshevliev, V. “The Bulgar inscriptions”, Sofia, 1987 Божилов 1979: Божилов, И. Анонимът на Хазе. България и Византия на долни Дунав в края на X век. София, 1979. Bozhilov 1979: Bozhilov, I. “The anonym of Haze. Bulgaria and Byzantium on the lower Danube in the end of X century”, Sofia, 1979 Венедиков 1979: Венедиков, И. Военното и административното устройство на България през IX и X век. София, 1979. Venedikov 1979: Venedikov, I. “The military and administrative organization of Bulgaria during IX and X century”, Sofia, 1979 Дуклянски презвитер 1967: Дуклянски презвитер. // Латински извори за българската история (ЛИБИ), T. 3. София, 1967 Duklian presbyter 1967: Duklian presbyter. // Latin sources for the Bulgarian history (LSBH), vol. 3, Sofia, 1967 Златарски 1994: Златарски, В. История на българската държава през средните векове. Т. 1. Ч. 2. София, 1994. Zlatarski 1994: Zlatarski, V. “History of the Bulgarian state in the middle ages”, vol. 1, Part 2, Sofia, 1994 Кекавмен 1968: Стратегикон от Кекавмен. // Гръцки извори за българската история (ГИБИ). Т. 7. София, 1968 Kekavmen 1968: Strategikon from Kekavmen. // Greek sources for the Bulgarian history (GSBH). vol. 7, Sofia, 1968 Кецкаров 1940: Кецкаров, В. Войни на българить въ Тракия 689-972. София, 1940. Ketskarov 1940: Ketskarov, V. “Wars of the Bulgarian in Thrace 689-972”, Sofia, 1940 Лъв Дякон 1964: Лъв Дякон. История. // Гръцки извори за българската история (ГИБИ). Т. 5. София, 1964 Leo Deacon 1964: Leo Deacon. History. // Greek sources for the Bulgarian history (GSBH), vol. 5, Sofia, 1964 Лъв VI Философ 1961: Лъв VI Философ. Тактика. // Гръцки извори за българската история (ГИБИ). Т. 4 . София, 1961. Leo VI Philosopher 1961: Leo VI Philosopher. Tactics. // Greek sources for the Bulgarian history (GSBH), vol. 4, Sofia, 1961 Псевдо-Симеон 1964: Хронография на Псевдо-Симеон. // Гръцки извори за българската история (ГИБИ). T. 5. София,1964. Pseudo-Simeon 1964: Chronography of Pseudo-Simeon. // Greek sources for the Bulgarian history (GSBH), vol. 5, Sofia, 1964 Скилица-Кедрин 1965: Скилица-Кедрин. История. // Гръцки извори за българската история (ГИБИ). Т. 6. София, 1965. Skilitsa-Kedrin 1965: Skilitsa-Kedrin. History. // Greek sources for the Bulgarian history (GSBH), vol. 6, Sofia, 1965 (с) Ivelin Ivanov ============================= (с) Electronic magazine LiterNet, 03.06.2004, № 6 (55) Other publications: History, 2002, № 4-5.

THE MILITARY TACTICS OF THE BULGARIANS VII-IX C. By information from the narrative sources Zhivko Zhekov The research of the different tactical methods, used by the Bulgarian forces in the period of the VII-IX c., is almost impossible without considering the narrative sources, reflecting the tactics and the strategy of other nomadic people, which have military effectives, similar to the Bulgarians. This suggests paying attention mainly on Turkics, Avars, Khazars and Magyars, with which the Bulgarians led fierce wars during the VII-IX c. Leo VI Philosopher, while describing the tactics applied by the Magyars1, on several occasions underlines that the Bulgarians use identical tactics2. The comparison of the described battle formations, tactical and individual methods of fighting, used by the Bulgarians, with texts from the "Strategikon" of Mauricius, in which the battle formations used by Avars and Turkics are described, shows that the descriptions in the "Tactics" of Leo VI almost entirely repeat the descriptions of the tactics, used by the Avars and Turkics in the "Strategikon"3. Therefore it could be accepted that during the considered period, the Bulgarians, including also in the IX century, use battle formations and tactics, which are similar and differ only in some insignificant details from those of the Turkics and the Avars. The Bulgarian army in the period of the VII - middle of IX century consisted mainly of horsemen. The infantry, as much as it existed, was of small size and did not affect the outcome of the battles. The Bulgarian heavy cavalry attacked in compact masses. For this purpose it formed up in detachments with different depth, in dependence of the size of the armies and the length of the battle line. It attempted in the course of the battle to hold its battle formation as long as possible4. The first row of the heavy cavalry consisted of the boils, the bagains and chosen warriors, proven with their courage, which have armour, protecting the chests and neck of the horses. Their task was to inflict a mighty ramming strike upon the enemy, piercing him with their long spears [Tr. Note: On Bulgarian the word for spear, lance and javelin is nearly the same - kopie]. At the same time, those formed in the first line took upon themselves the main part of the enemy arrows, because of which the defence of the front part of the horses for this first row was extremely important, because in a number of cases the enemy shoots not at the horsemen, but at the horses, and if the horse is killed, the horseman falls down and loses his battle efficiency. The heavy cavalry formed up in the centre of the battle formation, or if infantry detachments have been included in the Bulgarian army - in its flanks. This battle formation is characteristic for the Byzantine forces when they use combined battle formation with infantry and cavalry. The Bulgarians in the period VII-IX century fought many times with the Byzantines and it's natural that they acquire part of the positive elements of the Byzantine battle experience, which are applicable in Bulgarian conditions. The heavy cavalry was the main striking force of the Bulgarian army, because of which it inflicted the main strike, while the infantry engaged parts of the military effectives of the enemy, thus giving possibility to the striking forces to act more effectively against an enemy with smaller size. The detachments of light cavalry, placed on the flanks of the heavy cavalry, guarded the flanks and the rear, keeping it from enveloping movements of the adversary, and if possible they made enveloping movements on the enemy flanks themselves. In some cases the lightly armed cavalry was placed also behind the main battle line or in an ambush. Pic-1 The Bulgarians, like most nomads, held behind the main battle line a reserve, whose task was to make deep manoeuvres in the rear of the enemy or if necessary - to support that part of the battle formation, which cracks up under the enemy pressure. This tactics for segmenting of the battle formation in depth gave a bigger mobility on the battlefield and in need the enemy could be counter-attacked by the reserve, which plays the role of a second line. The main tactical methods, used by the Bulgarian army, were surrounding the enemy, placing ambushes, exhausting him through manoeuvring. Their use was objectively premised from the fact that the strongest battle contingent in it was the cavalry5. The frontal attacks were generally avoided; they're used in rare cases. The Bulgarians awaited the enemy to attack first, to break its battle formation and only after that they counter-attacked him. Sudden attacks were also skilfully used, especially in the cases, in which the formation of the enemy was already broken. This tactic was applied in the battle of the Onglos (680) by Khan Asparukh. He decided not to enter an open battle with the enemy, because the Byzantines had superiority in live force and armament. Due to these reasons the Bulgarian forces withdrew to a previously erected fortified camp. The Byzantine strategists evaluated highly the strength of the Bulgarian positions, because in a period of three-four days they decided not attack them6. The Bulgarian ruler used the hesitation of the enemy and counter-attacked. A possibility for such an interpretation gives the expression of the Byzantine chronicler that the Bulgarians, noticing the weakness in the Romeans, came to themselves and became bolder. In this case it's a matter of lighting-like attacks of the Bulgarian cavalry against the imperial forces, from which the latter suffered serious casualties. The departure of Constantine IV for Mesembria caused, according to the sources, discontent among the horsemen - the most battle efficient part of the imperial army7. It is possible that behind these blurred phrasings much more serious reasons could stand, which the Byzantine chroniclers purposefully pass over in silence. It's quite possible that Khan Asparukh through series of successful cavalry raids could have placed the imperial forces in a difficult situation, seriously hampering their supply of provisions and water. In support of such an interpretation of the events speaks also the fact that, while departing for Mesembria, the emperor ordered the strategists, to which he assigned the command of the forces, to enter a battle with the Bulgarians or to besiege the Bulgarian defences8. Therefore the imperial forces until this moment in the course of at least four days had not managed to completely surround the taken by the Bulgarians positions, as a result of which they did not start a regular siege, which could happen only if the Bulgarians have undertaken successful actions in neutralising these attempts through successful counter-attacks, made by the Bulgarian cavalry. The brevity of expression, used by the Byzantine authors to describe the reasons, which led to the defeat of the imperial forces, suggests the thought that the rout was not caused only by the departure of the emperor, but there are also more serious reasons for it. Probably the Byzantine strategists, left to command the forces, followed the order of the basileos to enter in a fight with the enemy, but their attack ended with a failure, which Khan Asparukh then used. He took the decision for an immediate counter-attack, which led to the full destruction of the imperial military effectives. The proposed historical reconstruction is, of course, to a great degree hypothetical, but it corresponds to the whole progress of the events, because of which it represents one of the possible variants for the progress of the battle in question. A similar awaiting tactic was also applied by the Bulgarian forces in the battle at the Veregava gorge (760). The Bulgarians first awaited the Byzantines to enter the passes of the Balkan Mountain, in which they inevitably disrupted their battle order and only then the enemy was decisively attacked and defeated9. In the battle at Markele /792/ Khan Kardam placed the Bulgarian army at fortified positions, awaited Constantine VI to attack, only after which he counter-attacked. According to Theophanes Confessor, Constantine VI entered the battle, convinced by false prophets that the victory will be his. With this said, it follows that the initiative for the beginning of the battle belongs to the imperial forces10, which attacked the Bulgarians in the taken by them defensive positions. During the attack the Byzantine forces disrupted their battle formation and because of that, according to the words of the Byzantine chronicler, they entered the battle disorderly. In this case the author, in his rhetorical impulse to deride the folly of the emperor and to present it as the only reason for the suffered by the Byzantine forces defeat, mixes in a certain degree the chronology of events. The Byzantines, naturally, attacked in a battle formation, but the uneven terrain led to a certain degree to its disruption, which was immediately used by Khan Kardam and the Bulgarian forces counter-attacked the enemy. Several years later, in 796, in the region of Avroleva Khan Kardam waited the Byzantine attack for 17 days and when the latter didn’t decide to attack at all, after their withdrawal, he also withdrew the Bulgarian army. Khan Kardam, by holding on to temporizing tactics, positioned the Bulgarian forces on fortified positions in a hilly and woody place, called by the Byzantines the Woody Avroleva. Constantine VI reached the Versinikia fortress, waited for some time to see if the Bulgarians would advance against him, after which he advanced towards the Bulgarian positions and settled in the place, called the Bare Avroleva. According to Theophanes Confessor, the emperor called in vain upon the Bulgarians to come out of their positions and enter a fight on the open field11. The Bulgarian command, in the face of Khan Kardam, however, did not succumb to the Byzantine provocations and didn’t leave the fortified positions. But Constantine VI, having learned his lesson from his previous defeat at Markele – 792, also did not decide to attack the Bulgarian positions and after 17 days of useless waiting he preferred to withdraw his troops. Pic-2 The Battle of Versinikia (22.VІ.813 AD) is a beautiful demonstration of Bulgarian tactics of temporizing the enemy’s attack on fortified positions, followed by a Bulgarian counter-attack. In the summer of 813 Emperor Michael I Rangaves decided to launch a counter-advance against the Bulgarians in Thrace. He transferred to Thrace the forces of the Asia Minor themes12, added to them the forces of the European themes and the tagmas, whereas the imperial army in this military campaign practically included the main military effectives of the empire13. In the course of at least a month, during May and June 813, the Byzantine forces manoeuvred in Thrace without reaching any considerable results. Michael I Rangaves, who personally commanded them, didn’t dare even to attack Mesemvria. In this situation, in the beginning of June 813, Khan Krum decided to counter-attack and moved the Bulgarian forces to the south, placing them in the vicinity of the Versinikia fortress. The Bulgarians erected fortified positions on a hilly terrain. Choosing exactly this relief for a battlefield demonstrates again the holding of the Bulgarian command on to the awaiting tactics. The Byzantine command, after receiving information for the positioning of the Bulgarian army, left its positions near Adrianople and set off towards the Bulgarians. After reaching Versinikia, the Byzantines, despite of their indisputable numerical superiority14, did not decide to attack the heavily fortified Bulgarian positions and attempted to lure the Bulgarians out of them into the open field. According to the Continuator of Theophanes, Michael I Rangaves repeatedly summoned the Bulgarians to battle, but they did not dare to attack. The fact that the Byzantines did not attack, but called for a battle, shows that they didn’t wish to fight on the chosen by the Bulgarians positions, but they tried to bring them out to the open plains. Khan Krum didn’t fall to the Byzantine provocations and the Bulgarian troops didn’t leave their positions. For 15 days the two armies stood formed one against the other, but the Byzantines didn’t launch any decisive attack15, but were content with isolated attacks against the Bulgarian positions, expressed mainly as skirmishes with ranged weapons. Finally the Bulgarians managed to impose their own tactics, this wrecked the nerves of the Byzantine strategists and they compelled Emperor Michael I Rangaves to issue an order for attack. Considering the battle line of the Bulgarian forces, there aren’t any reports. One of the Byzantine wings was taken by the forces of the Macedonia and Thrace themes, commanded by the strategus of the Macedonia theme Ioan Aplakis, and the other wing – by the forces of the Anatolik and probably the Armeniak theme. The rest of the imperial forces, together with the tagmas, were in the centre of the battle formation and were commanded directly by the emperor. Despite of the general order for attack, the imperial forces didn’t attack simultaneously. First in battle entered the troops, commanded by Ioan Aplakis. Their attack was not immediately supported by the rest of the Byzantine forces. According to Scriptor Incertus, which gives the most detailed records of the battle, the other imperial troops didn’t back up this attack. The first, according to this Byzantine source, fled the forces of the Anatolik theme16. These reports are backed up also by other Byzantine chroniclers, but there’s also a contrary thesis, according to which the soldiers of the Anatolik theme fought bravely and the first to flee were the forces in the centre, commanded directly by the emperor17. In this case it’s a matter of a lack of coordination in the realization of the attack among the imperial army. The troops, commanded by Michael I Rangaves and Leo, were delayed in supporting the attack of those, commanded by Ioan Aplakis. This difference in the actions of the imperial army, combined with the fact that descending from the heights of their own positions and climbing to the heights of the Bulgarian ones would lead to a breaking of the Byzantine battle lines, proved to be fatal for the forces of the empire. Khan Krum made use of this situation and the Bulgarian army moved on to a counter-attack18. The Bulgarian detachments attacked firstly the forces of Ioan Aplakis, which were probably outflanked, because of which they’re in a bad position. After this, the Bulgarian troops engaged also the Byzantine contingents, positioned at the centre, and by this way Khan Krum used the confusion of the imperial forces and practically tore them to three separate parts, which he crushed consecutively. The last to enter the battle were the forces of the Anatolik theme. From the claim of most of the sources that they were the first to flee, and according to some – even without any engagement in a fight, it’s clearly seen that they established the last contact with the enemy: at this moment of the battle the Bulgarian forces were obviously having a serious advantage in the fight, because of which the forces, commanded by Leo, fled after a short engagement. Soon after them also the detachments at the centre, commanded personally by the emperor, were taking a flight. The rout of the main part of the enemy’s army and the continuing fierce resistance of the Macedonians and the Thracians, which were surrounded by the Bulgarian forces and were nearly completely destroyed together with their commander Ioan Aplakis, initially caused Krum to act carefully. He waited for some time to see if his enemy wasn’t preparing an ambush or outflanking for him19. Only after he was convinced that the Byzantines were really routing, he gave the orders to the whole army to start a general pursuit of the enemy. The Byzantine defeat was catastrophic. The Bulgarians looted the Byzantine camp and chased the enemy to a great depth. The Byzantine forces stopped their flight only at Constantinople20. The Battle of Versinikia is scrutinized so detailed, because there are the fullest descriptions of it in the sources. Because of which it gives us the greatest possibility to analyze the tactics of the Bulgarian army. The fact that the Bulgarian forces use in it tactics, used also in other battles, for which there are not so detailed descriptions, shows that there is a developed and stable Bulgarian tactic, which was used for more than a century now. In the only battle, in which the Bulgarians probably attacked frontally the enemy, the Battle of Anchialus (763), they suffered a heavy defeat. The description of this battle is short and vague, because of which its analysis is quite difficult. But the general progress of the fierce fight, which was a long-lasting one, suggests that the Bulgarians have frontally attacked the enemy, as a result of which there were many casualties on both sides. The violence of the fight is confirmed also by the report of Patriarch Nicephorus that actually Constantine V Kopronim was crushed near Anchialus and the Byzantines suffered great casualties in manpower in the battle21. Initially the Bulgarian forces held on to the usual temporizing tactics also in this military campaign. They positioned themselves on preliminary fortified positions in the fore-mountains along the South-Eastern slopes of the Aytos Mountain. Later on, due to unknown reasons, Khan Telets changed his initial plan, went down to the field near Anchialus and entered a battle on a flat country, suitable for the combined actions of the Byzantine infantry and cavalry. The Byzantine positions were additionally strengthened by the fact that the rear of the imperial armies was covered by the nearby Anchialus fortress, which did not allow the Bulgarians to make deep flank-movements on the enemy. The Byzantine positions were probably placed between the South-Western bank of the Pomorie Lake and the Black Sea coast. Such a position makes impossible any attempts for outflanking and deep flank-movements in the rear from the side of the enemy. In this position of the imperial forces, the only possible decision of the Bulgarian ruler could be a frontal attack. Such an attack was doomed to failure because the cavalry was not capable to break through a dense phalanx of heavily-armed infantry spearmen. Because of which the authors of the Byzantine military treatises prescribe on a plain and open terrain against nations, having a strong cavalry and using orders similar to the Bulgarian battle order, to act with a dense phalanx of heavily-armed spearmen22. Khan Telets obviously didn’t assess the situation right and took a wrong tactical decision, which led to a catastrophic defeat of the Bulgarian forces. The Battle of Anchialus (708) demonstrates another tactical method, used on the battlefield by the Bulgarian army – surprise attack in the moment, in which the enemy’s battle line is disorganized for some reason. Khan Tervel used the scattering of the Byzantine cavalry in search for fodder and surprisingly attacked his enemy. The enemy cavalry didn’t manage to re-form and was crushed, whereas its rout probably caused the rout also of the whole Byzantine army23. After victory in a particular battle, the Bulgarians did launch a pursuit to a great depth with the aim of destroying maximum number of enemy soldiers. After the defeat of the Byzantines at the Onglos, the enemy was chased around 150-200 km. till the vicinity of the Varna region, in which a large part of the enemy military effectives was destroyed. This is one of the reasons why Constantine IV Pogonatus couldn’t organize a counter-advance against the Bulgarians in the next few years and was forced to accept and keep the peace. After the victory at Markele – 792, the Bulgarian forces pursued the Byzantines all the way to Constantinople, because the latter stopped their flight only there, and during the pursuit itself were destroyed a large number of enemy soldiers, as well as many and famous Byzantine strategists, among which was also the famous Michael Lahanodrakon24. After the victory at Versinikia (22.VI.813) the Bulgarians again chased the enemy to a great distance – almost to the vicinity of Constantinople, because also in this case the Byzantines stopped their flight in the imperial capital. One of the strongest tactical weapons, used by the Bulgarian khans, was the ambush combined with a night attack on the enemy. A brilliant example for the realization of such tactics was the battle in the night of 26.VII.811, in which Khan Krum shattered the Byzantine army, commanded by Nicephorus I Genikus. A part of the Bulgarian troops have obviously done a parallel to the Byzantines march, following their movement, while in the same time the rest of the Bulgarian, Slavic and Avar military contingents have moved in the direction of the main Bulgarian military forces, placed at a preliminary chosen and fortified position25. When the enemy reached this preliminary chosen position, Khan Krum ordered his advance to be stopped through flanking strikes, but without the Bulgarians entering a general fight. This hypothesis is confirmed by the setting up of a Byzantine camp near the Bulgarian fortifications, and by the words of the emperor that “even if we were birds, we wouldn’t be able to fly over”. The Byzantines were forced to stop because in marching columns they wouldn’t be able to successfully counteract the Bulgarian raids. These events probably took place at dusk and considering the forces fatigue from the march, the strategists and the basileos decided to set up a camp and fight a battle the next day. Due to the presence of the Bulgarian cavalry the enemy couldn’t build up a camp by all the rules of the military art and the marching columns settled down in the places where they had stopped. As a result of this dislocation the tagmas, which guarded the emperor, have probably remained at the centre of the marching columns, but there was some distance between them and the rest of the troops, which is confirmed also by the sources. According to the reports of Theophanes, Emperor Nicephorus and the people around him heard strange noises in the night26, which suggests that the preparation of the Bulgarian attack was heard only by the archons and the tagmas, surrounding the imperial person, therefore the rest of the forces were positioned in some distance, because of which they didn’t immediately learn about the start of the Bulgarian attack. Khan Krum awaited his enemy and probably withdrew his forces to a certain distance, demonstrating willingness to fight the other day. Only this way could be interpreted the fact that the Byzantine army didn’t stay in battle alert the whole night and a part of the soldiers were allowed to have a sleep. The khan used this moment and ordered probably to the heavy cavalry, which is the main striking force of the Bulgarian army, to attack the tagmas. The latter didn’t endure long to this frontal night attack and were routed after a short resistance, while Nicephorus I Genikus, left without guards, was killed. The rout of the tagmas, the most elite part of the Byzantine army, and the news of the emperor’s death demoralized the other forces and they panically fled. The fortified positions, erected by the Bulgarians at the northern slopes of Stara Planina [Tr. Note: the Balkan Mountains], detained the enemy’s rout and he sustained great casualties. Unlike the other battles, in which the Bulgarians were victors, this time they didn’t organize a deep pursuit. Probably one of the main reasons for this was the exhaustion of the Bulgarian forces and the low number of the efficient Bulgarian military effectives – because of which Khan Krum, in order to increase the numbers of his forces, had to recruit many Slavs and Avars [Tr. Note: and women, by the way], although they did help defeating the Byzantines, as it is seen in the official feasts, organized only several days after the battle, with the participation of their chieftains. But the Bulgarian ruler probably didn’t trust them enough and therefore he preferred, instead of organizing a pursuit, to be satisfied with the achieved victory, stabilizing his power in the interior of the state. The detailed analysis of this battle allows us to see the way how the Bulgarian forces applied the tactics of ambushes and night attacks, for the use of which there are a number of reports in the sources27. The various arsenal of tactical methods, used by the Bulgarian army during the considered period, shows that the Bulgarians until and during the IX c. continued using tactics, characteristic for the tribes, which populate the steppes of Asia and Europe. In the same time they acquired a number of achievements of the Byzantine military science, which contributed to the increase of their military might. The mixing of different tactical schools, the one of the steppe nomads and the Byzantine school, descendant of the top achievements of the ancient military thought, allowed the Bulgarian state, despite of its limited resources, to successfully oppose the much stronger in economical aspect Byzantine Empire, and in a number of cases – also to win brilliant victories. [1] Leonis Imperatoris Tactica // PG, 107, 1863, col. 672–1120, 43–60, col. 956 D-961 D= ГИБИ [Tr. Note: ГИБИ – Гръцки Източници за Българска История; GSBH – Greek Sources for Bulgarian History], 4, с. 168–171. 2 Leo, Tact., XVIII, 43; 45; 75 PG, 107, col. 956 D-957 А; 964 D=ГИБИ, 4, с. 168, 172. 3 Mauricii Strategicon, ed. T. Dennis, Wien, 1981 // CFHB, 17, XI, 2, 5–78 (p. 360–366)= ГИБИ, 2, с. 278–280. 4 Leo, Tact., XVIII, 43, PG, 107, col. 956 D-957 A= ГИБИ, 4, с. 168. 5 Leo, Tact., XVIII, 48, 50–52, 56, 58, 63, PG, 107, col. 957 С-D; 960 В-С; 961 A= ГИБИ, 4, с. 169–170. 6 Nicephori Archiepiscopi Constantinopolitani Opuscula Historica, Ed. C. de. Boor, Lipsiae, 1880, p. 35, 1-6= ГИБИ, 3, с. 296; Turner D., The trouble with the Trinity: the context of a slogan during the reign of Constantine IV (668–85) // BMGS, 27, 2003, 68–119, p. 90. 7 Theophanes Confesor Chronographia, ed. C. de Boor, Lipsiae, 1883, p. 358, 27-30; 359, 4-5= ГИБИ, 3, с. 263; Niceph., p. 35, 7-9; 11-13= ГИБИ, 3, с. 296. 8 Niceph., p. 35, 9-11= ГИБИ, 3, с. 296. 9 Theoph., p. 431, 6-9= ГИБИ, 3, с. 270. 10 Theoph., p. 467, 29-33= ГИБИ, 3, с. 277; Haldon J.F., Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565–1204, L., 1999, p. 211. 11 Theoph., p. 470, 19-21= ГИБИ, 3, с. 277. 12 Theoph., p. 500, 12-14; Scriptor Incertus, Historia de Leone Bardae filio apud: Leonis Grammatici Chronographia, Ex rec. I. Bekkeri, Bonnae, 1842, 335–362, p. 336, 19-21; Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, Ed. I. Bekker, Bonnae, 1838, p. 13, 19-20. 13 Scriptor Incertus, p. 336, 16-18; Ioannis Scylitzae Synopsis Historiarum, Eds. Beck H.-G., Kambylis A., Keydell R., Berlin, 1973, p. 5, 80- 6, 82= ГИБИ, 6, с. 226; Ioannis Zonarae, Epitomae Historiarum libri XIII-XVIII, ed. T. Büttner-Wobst, Tomus III, Bonnae, 1897 // CSHB, XV, 18, 5 (p. 317, 1-2)= ГИБИ, 7, с. 165. 14 Theoph., p. 500, 28–31; Scriptor Incertus, p. 337, 9-10, 22-23 = ГИБИ, 4, 17–18. 15 Scriptor Incertus, p. 337, 9-13= ГИБИ, 4, с. 17; Beševliev V., Die protobulgarische Periode der bulgarischen Geschichte, Amsterdam, 1980, S. 253–254. 16 Theoph., p. 501, 1–2= ГИБИ, 4, с. 288; Scriptor Incertus, p. 337, 18-340, 7-8= ГИБИ, 4, с. 18–19. 17 Theoph. Cont., p. 15, 18-21= ГИБИ, 5, с. 111. 18 Scriptor Incertus, p. 337, 22-338, 1= ГИБИ, 4, с. 18. 19 Theoph., p. 501, 32-34= ГИБИ, 3, с. 289. 20 Scriptor Incertus, p. 338, 17-22= ГИБИ, 4, с. 18; Theoph., p. 501, 34-502, 1-2= ГИБИ, 3, с. 289. 21 Niceph., Antirrhesis ІІІ, col. 508 B; Georgius Monachos, p. 762, 25-763, 14= ГИБИ, 4, с. 52, ed. C de. Boor. 22 Mauricii, Strat., XI, 1, 42-44 (p. 356) = ГИБИ, 2, с. 278; Leo., Tact., XVIII, 63, PG, col. 961 A= ГИБИ, 4, с. 170. 23 Niceph., p. 43, 12-15; Haldon J., Warfare, State..., p. 211. 24 Theoph., p. 467, 32-468, 4= ГИБИ, 3, с. 277 25 Narratio anonyma e Codice Vaticano, Ed. Dujčev Iv., 1965, p. 212, 41-42= ГИБИ, 4, с. 13; Theoph., p. 490, 29-31. 26 Theoph., p. 490, 33-491, 3= ГИБИ, 3, с. 282. 27 ЛИБИ [Tr. Note: ЛИБИ – Латински Източници за Българска История; LSBH – Latin Sources for Bulgarian History], 1, с. 411–412; с. 313. Original: http://www.vi-books.com/vis/vis4_3/01.htm

Аз пък няма да гласувам, защото вече гласувах в самото начало на кампанията, преди рекламите. Преди малко само влезнах да дам гласа си и за Тервелчо, че са взели и са го сложили! Но малко "храна за размисъл": Защо няма да гласувате? Казвате, "Не мога да избера само един" - тогава избирате няколко. Аз например гласувах за почти всичките ми любими владетели. Не е забранено. Казвате, "Кощунствено е" - аз пък казвам, че зависи от гледната точка. Но ето още нещо - вие няма да гласувате, а гореспоменатите чалгаджии ще гласуват. И в крайна сметка може наистина за най-велик българин да изберат някой наш съвременник (а мен хич не ме интересува Бойко Борисов ли ще е или Азис - не искам съвременници никакви). Чия ще е вината тогава? На чалгаджиите? Да. Но и на тези, които не са гласували, за тези които смятат (и са) за по-достойни! Ако вие не гласувате - един глас по-малко за княз Борис в сравнение с гласовете за Анелия, да кажем. То май дори избива леко на елитарност - "Аз съм по-интелигентен от онези чалгари, тази класация е под достойнството ми и не ме интересува дали ще изберат Климент Охридски или Преслава." Лично за мен, това е възможност да покажа кои личности от българската история най-много ми допадат и на които най-много се възхищавам. Аз не гласувах за "Най-велик българин", а за "Най-великите за мен българи". Това е...

За щастие, тези май са по-рядко срещани в България. Досега рядко съм попадал на литература на "Стражева Кула" (издателството им), нито пък са идвали техни мисионери да ми предлагат такава. За разлика от мормоните, които, особено сега през лятото, са се разщъкали като хлебарки. Спомням си даже как преди около 15 години баща ми се беше захванал да спори с едни такива (имаха си църква съвсем наблизо до леля ми, та често идваха). Интересен сблъсък - протестанти срещу мормони. Първите по принцип са доста по-добре запознати с Библията, вторите пък специално са обучавани за мисионерството си дори и на български език. Ето един въпрос и от мен: Какво е секта? Оригиналното значение на думата, доколкото знам, е нещо от рода на "част от нещо". Както в Библията пише например за фарисейската секта като "част от юдаизма", а не като "юдейска ерес". Тоест, защо "секта" днес се възприема като "ерес"? И още нещо: аз съм кръстен като православен християнин (такъв съм и като "произход" - българин, т.е. православен, макар и това да би трябвало да е анахронизъм вече), израснал съм като протестант/евангелист/петдесятен, а като вяра май клоня повече към агностик. В крайна сметка...

Модът е за излизащата през есента Medieval: Total War 2 и се казва "Leipsana Rōmaika". Началото е около падането на Цариград през 1204 докъм края на 13 век. Отговорникът за южните славяни (който пък е поляк) се свърза с мен в един друг форум и ме помоли за помощ и преводи на единиците. Та заради него се поразтърсих малко за информация за евентуални единици, каквато впрочем и все още търся, и за някакви картинки, каквито пък са изключително трудни за намиране. Сега дръпнах едни Оспрейки и се надявам там да има нещо... Иначе се свързах и с един българин, който беше постнал в средата на тази страница подобно инфо и който се оказа, че също е проучвал такива неща за същия този мод! Както и да е, темата е за тежката българска конница и още информация за нея във ВБЦ би ми била доста полезна...

Книжката е от 1997 (аз съм си го писал и в името на директорията, де), та затова завършва със Стоянов. Сега може да има по-нова "версия"... Warlord, мислиш ли, че конкретно тази картинка е що-годе достоверна. Защото съм се загърбил да търся инфо за българската армия от XIII век, и особено картинки на воини от онова време, за мод на една комп. игра. Та показах и тази картинка, но с бележката, че е чисто художествена работа и не мога да кажа доколко е достоверна. Ако е добра - да им съобщя! Btw Galahad, чудя се откъде ли си намерил една от галериите ми - не си спомням да съм давал линк тук или в Бойна Слава...

Дванадесетте Цезари ги завърших. Сега съм на "История бугарскога народа" на Милан Савич (на сръбски) и "Българи от старо време" на Любен Каравелов.

Велики Преслав като архитектурен аналог на Константинопол През 2006 година се навършват 30 години от проучването на патриаршеския комплекс в дворците на Велики Преслав. Разкопките започнали с откриването и трудното разучаване на така наречената Голямата дворцова базилика. Проф. Николай Овчаров предостави схема на Големият императорски дворец в Константинопол и по нея и разкритите средновековни сгради в старопрестолния ни град той доказа теорията си, че Втората българска столица е строена по подобие на византийската. При започването на разкопките преди три десетилетия такава вероятност изобщо не ни минаваше през главите, споделя професорът. Тогава битувало мнението, че на мястото има само един замък, но днес благодарение работата и на екипа на проф. Маргарита Ваклинова е ясно, че във Велики Преслав има ансамбъл от множество постройки, от които са разкрити едва десет. "Окончателното изясняване на функциите на патриаршеската част в чертите на царския дворец", това беше мотото на срещата на проф. Овчаров с журналисти, на която той подробно описа как е функционирал патриаршеският комплекс през 9-10 век, разположен в южната част на старините. Първа е разкрита голямата базилика-42 м дворцова църква през 1976 г. Малко по-късно, западно от нея, археолозите откриват т.н. архиепископско-патриаршеска палата, която има също аналогия с константинополския дворец, а по-късно в рамките на почти 20 години се разкрити и апартаментите на патриарси ни до 971 г., когато патриаршията е преместена в Дръстър. Вече се знаят имената на четирима български патриарси, които са обитавали този център. Тези разкрития ни дадоха възможност да проникнем в тайните на цялостното устройство на царския дворец и да направим нови съпоставки, категоричен е професорът откривател и на Перперикон. Виждайки мястото на откритите сгради в дворцовия комплекс във Велики Преслав и съпоставил ги с изобилните писмени данни за Константинопол, оказало се, че Втората българска столица е строена по негово подобие. Поглед върху Плана на великия императорски дворец в Константинопол: комплексът се състои от множество площади и дворове, светски дворци и катедрали. Все още не е ясно дали във Велики Преслав е съществувал Хиподрума - място, където през различни врати са влизали Императорът и народът и са се наслаждавали на надбягване с колесници. Всички църкви се намират източно от дворците и са тясно свързани с жилищните помещения на Императора. В южната част на комплекса са разположени патриаршеските части, сред тях е дворецът Томаитис, на който е намерена вече пряка аналогия в патриаршеския комплекс във Велики Преслав. Според всички данни, с които разполагат археолозите до момента в старопрестолния български град има две катедрали, разположени като тези в Константинопол-царска и патриаршеска. Репликирани са и царските апартаменти, свързани с царската или владетелската църква, съответно централният площад-Августион. В момента на тази площ се извисяват две орехови дървета и най-вероятно ще трябва да бъдат изкоренени, за да продължат разкопките, един площад който е разделител между царската част и патриаршеската част и сградите в патриаршеската част. Тази година в патриаршеския сектор във Велики Преслав са наети 42 души, които ще участват в сезонните разкопки. Те ще трябва да разкриват площи за окончателното изясняване на структурата на този площад, който се намира между царските и патриаршеските покои. Той е бил с размери между 150/60 м и преди дни работниците попаднаха на първите плочи от площада, свързвал източната порта на двореца с другите части на комплекса. Въпреки многобройните съвпадения в разположението на постройките, не можем да кажем, че са копия на тези в Константинопол, категоричен е професорът. Не са копия, а са реплика, защото двете големи църкви не са напълно идентични с тези във византийската столица, там храмовете са от центричен тип, кръстокуполни, а във Велики Преслав стремежът е към базиликални постройки. Двете са големи трикорабни базилики. Различия има и в големината на площта, на която са разположени градовете. Велики Преслав е застроен на три пъти по-малко място, но заради разположението на сградите говорим за репликиране, уточнява Николай Овчаров. Амбицията на българските владетели може да бъде наречена и налудничава, но е факт, че цар Симеон е имал такова желание и се е стремял към пълно ликвидиране на Византия и заемането на нейното място в средновековна Европа от България, която по това време е била огромна държава - 9-10 век. Малко е трудно на съвременния българин да си представи мислите и чувствата на хората от онова време и именно историческите паметници ни дават възможността да погледнем с техните очи. Днес посетителят на Велики Преслав може да добие ясна представа за разположението на постройките в патриаршеския комплекс. Най-добре запазена е банята, която е и най-голямата открита у нас от този период, строена е по подобие на аристократичните късноантични бани. От солариума се е влизало в съблекалнята, от там във фригидариума и от него в топлото помещение, което е с подово отопление, захранвано от специални пещи, които са били използвани и от кухнята в съседство. Макар и само на каменни основи старопрестолният град вече има облик и е изключително интересен за туристите. Нужни са обаче много средства за работата по разкопките. Миналата година от Министерството на културата е изработена 10-годишна стратегия за развитие на българската култура. Проф.Овчаров се интересувал от обектите, които ще бъдат под специалната държавна грижа. Със свои колеги направили примерен списък от 40 паметника на културата, сред които и старите столици Плиска и Велики Преслав. Това са обекти, които трябва да бъдат обгрижвани от държавата изцяло, не давани на концесии, както сега се говори, категоричен е професорът. Информацията е на вестник "Форум"

Аха - Светата Троица, ака Бог Отец, Бог Син и Светия Дух. Т.е. за всички християни Исус Христос е не просто Божи син (или пък Човешки син), а и едно от трите проявления на Бог. За мюсюлманите пък си най-обикновен пророк, като останалите - Ной, Авраам, Мойсей. А за психолозите е страдащ от разтроение на личността, може би...

Римски император основал Троян Йовка Димитрова, 24 часа, 15 юни 2006 15-редов надпис откри археологът от Националния Исторически Музей Иван Христов при разкопките на Состра – античния предшественик на Троян. За това съобщи директорът на музея Божидар Димитров вчера. „Откриването на надпис е най-високо ценената находка в археологията. Тя е по-значима и от златото, тъй като, освен че е много рядка, дава и точни сведения за историята”, коментира Димитров. Надписът осведомява, че римският император Галиен настанил в Состра т. нар. червена кохорта (армейско подразделение) на гарнизон в града. 67-ият император въвежда нов тип войски – мобилна конница, елитни части, подчинени на владетеля, най-успешната тактика срещу варварите. Галиен управлява Римската империя между 253-268 г. сл. Хр. Находката е свидетелство за усилията на Рим да опази днешните български земи от нашествията на готите, които в 251 г. край Абритус (Разград) разбиват римската армия и убиват предшественика на Галиен император Деций. Досега се смяташе, че готите са унищожили окончателно римските градове в региона, но надписът, който е от 253 г., доказва, че съпротивата е продължавала. Димитров обеща да остави надписа на троянци, ако кметът на града приеме да го постави пред общината за всеобщо възхищение.

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