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The military tactics of the Bulgarians VII-IX C.


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By information from the narrative sources

Zhivko Zhekov

The research of the different tactical methods, used by the Bulgarian forces in the period of the VII-IX c., is almost impossible without considering the narrative sources, reflecting the tactics and the strategy of other nomadic people, which have military effectives, similar to the Bulgarians. This suggests paying attention mainly on Turkics, Avars, Khazars and Magyars, with which the Bulgarians led fierce wars during the VII-IX c.

Leo VI Philosopher, while describing the tactics applied by the Magyars1, on several occasions underlines that the Bulgarians use identical tactics2. The comparison of the described battle formations, tactical and individual methods of fighting, used by the Bulgarians, with texts from the "Strategikon" of Mauricius, in which the battle formations used by Avars and Turkics are described, shows that the descriptions in the "Tactics" of Leo VI almost entirely repeat the descriptions of the tactics, used by the Avars and Turkics in the "Strategikon"3. Therefore it could be accepted that during the considered period, the Bulgarians, including also in the IX century, use battle formations and tactics, which are similar and differ only in some insignificant details from those of the Turkics and the Avars.

The Bulgarian army in the period of the VII - middle of IX century consisted mainly of horsemen. The infantry, as much as it existed, was of small size and did not affect the outcome of the battles. The Bulgarian heavy cavalry attacked in compact masses. For this purpose it formed up in detachments with different depth, in dependence of the size of the armies and the length of the battle line. It attempted in the course of the battle to hold its battle formation as long as possible4. The first row of the heavy cavalry consisted of the boils, the bagains and chosen warriors, proven with their courage, which have armour, protecting the chests and neck of the horses. Their task was to inflict a mighty ramming strike upon the enemy, piercing him with their long spears [Tr. Note: On Bulgarian the word for spear, lance and javelin is nearly the same - kopie]. At the same time, those formed in the first line took upon themselves the main part of the enemy arrows, because of which the defence of the front part of the horses for this first row was extremely important, because in a number of cases the enemy shoots not at the horsemen, but at the horses, and if the horse is killed, the horseman falls down and loses his battle efficiency.

The heavy cavalry formed up in the centre of the battle formation, or if infantry detachments have been included in the Bulgarian army - in its flanks. This battle formation is characteristic for the Byzantine forces when they use combined battle formation with infantry and cavalry. The Bulgarians in the period VII-IX century fought many times with the Byzantines and it's natural that they acquire part of the positive elements of the Byzantine battle experience, which are applicable in Bulgarian conditions. The heavy cavalry was the main striking force of the Bulgarian army, because of which it inflicted the main strike, while the infantry engaged parts of the military effectives of the enemy, thus giving possibility to the striking forces to act more effectively against an enemy with smaller size. The detachments of light cavalry, placed on the flanks of the heavy cavalry, guarded the flanks and the rear, keeping it from enveloping movements of the adversary, and if possible they made enveloping movements on the enemy flanks themselves. In some cases the lightly armed cavalry was placed also behind the main battle line or in an ambush.


The Bulgarians, like most nomads, held behind the main battle line a reserve, whose task was to make deep manoeuvres in the rear of the enemy or if necessary - to support that part of the battle formation, which cracks up under the enemy pressure. This tactics for segmenting of the battle formation in depth gave a bigger mobility on the battlefield and in need the enemy could be counter-attacked by the reserve, which plays the role of a second line.

The main tactical methods, used by the Bulgarian army, were surrounding the enemy, placing ambushes, exhausting him through manoeuvring. Their use was objectively premised from the fact that the strongest battle contingent in it was the cavalry5. The frontal attacks were generally avoided; they're used in rare cases. The Bulgarians awaited the enemy to attack first, to break its battle formation and only after that they counter-attacked him. Sudden attacks were also skilfully used, especially in the cases, in which the formation of the enemy was already broken.

This tactic was applied in the battle of the Onglos (680) by Khan Asparukh. He decided not to enter an open battle with the enemy, because the Byzantines had superiority in live force and armament. Due to these reasons the Bulgarian forces withdrew to a previously erected fortified camp. The Byzantine strategists evaluated highly the strength of the Bulgarian positions, because in a period of three-four days they decided not attack them6. The Bulgarian ruler used the hesitation of the enemy and counter-attacked. A possibility for such an interpretation gives the expression of the Byzantine chronicler that the Bulgarians, noticing the weakness in the Romeans, came to themselves and became bolder. In this case it's a matter of lighting-like attacks of the Bulgarian cavalry against the imperial forces, from which the latter suffered serious casualties.

The departure of Constantine IV for Mesembria caused, according to the sources, discontent among the horsemen - the most battle efficient part of the imperial army7. It is possible that behind these blurred phrasings much more serious reasons could stand, which the Byzantine chroniclers purposefully pass over in silence. It's quite possible that Khan Asparukh through series of successful cavalry raids could have placed the imperial forces in a difficult situation, seriously hampering their supply of provisions and water. In support of such an interpretation of the events speaks also the fact that, while departing for Mesembria, the emperor ordered the strategists, to which he assigned the command of the forces, to enter a battle with the Bulgarians or to besiege the Bulgarian defences8. Therefore the imperial forces until this moment in the course of at least four days had not managed to completely surround the taken by the Bulgarians positions, as a result of which they did not start a regular siege, which could happen only if the Bulgarians have undertaken successful actions in neutralising these attempts through successful counter-attacks, made by the Bulgarian cavalry.

The brevity of expression, used by the Byzantine authors to describe the reasons, which led to the defeat of the imperial forces, suggests the thought that the rout was not caused only by the departure of the emperor, but there are also more serious reasons for it. Probably the Byzantine strategists, left to command the forces, followed the order of the basileos to enter in a fight with the enemy, but their attack ended with a failure, which Khan Asparukh then used. He took the decision for an immediate counter-attack, which led to the full destruction of the imperial military effectives. The proposed historical reconstruction is, of course, to a great degree hypothetical, but it corresponds to the whole progress of the events, because of which it represents one of the possible variants for the progress of the battle in question.

A similar awaiting tactic was also applied by the Bulgarian forces in the battle at the Veregava gorge (760). The Bulgarians first awaited the Byzantines to enter the passes of the Balkan Mountain, in which they inevitably disrupted their battle order and only then the enemy was decisively attacked and defeated9.

In the battle at Markele /792/ Khan Kardam placed the Bulgarian army at fortified positions, awaited Constantine VI to attack, only after which he counter-attacked. According to Theophanes Confessor, Constantine VI entered the battle, convinced by false prophets that the victory will be his. With this said, it follows that the initiative for the beginning of the battle belongs to the imperial forces10, which attacked the Bulgarians in the taken by them defensive positions. During the attack the Byzantine forces disrupted their battle formation and because of that, according to the words of the Byzantine chronicler, they entered the battle disorderly. In this case the author, in his rhetorical impulse to deride the folly of the emperor and to present it as the only reason for the suffered by the Byzantine forces defeat, mixes in a certain degree the chronology of events. The Byzantines, naturally, attacked in a battle formation, but the uneven terrain led to a certain degree to its disruption, which was immediately used by Khan Kardam and the Bulgarian forces counter-attacked the enemy.

Several years later, in 796, in the region of Avroleva Khan Kardam waited the Byzantine attack for 17 days and when the latter didn’t decide to attack at all, after their withdrawal, he also withdrew the Bulgarian army. Khan Kardam, by holding on to temporizing tactics, positioned the Bulgarian forces on fortified positions in a hilly and woody place, called by the Byzantines the Woody Avroleva. Constantine VI reached the Versinikia fortress, waited for some time to see if the Bulgarians would advance against him, after which he advanced towards the Bulgarian positions and settled in the place, called the Bare Avroleva. According to Theophanes Confessor, the emperor called in vain upon the Bulgarians to come out of their positions and enter a fight on the open field11. The Bulgarian command, in the face of Khan Kardam, however, did not succumb to the Byzantine provocations and didn’t leave the fortified positions. But Constantine VI, having learned his lesson from his previous defeat at Markele – 792, also did not decide to attack the Bulgarian positions and after 17 days of useless waiting he preferred to withdraw his troops.


The Battle of Versinikia (22.VІ.813 AD) is a beautiful demonstration of Bulgarian tactics of temporizing the enemy’s attack on fortified positions, followed by a Bulgarian counter-attack. In the summer of 813 Emperor Michael I Rangaves decided to launch a counter-advance against the Bulgarians in Thrace. He transferred to Thrace the forces of the Asia Minor themes12, added to them the forces of the European themes and the tagmas, whereas the imperial army in this military campaign practically included the main military effectives of the empire13. In the course of at least a month, during May and June 813, the Byzantine forces manoeuvred in Thrace without reaching any considerable results. Michael I Rangaves, who personally commanded them, didn’t dare even to attack Mesemvria. In this situation, in the beginning of June 813, Khan Krum decided to counter-attack and moved the Bulgarian forces to the south, placing them in the vicinity of the Versinikia fortress. The Bulgarians erected fortified positions on a hilly terrain. Choosing exactly this relief for a battlefield demonstrates again the holding of the Bulgarian command on to the awaiting tactics.

The Byzantine command, after receiving information for the positioning of the Bulgarian army, left its positions near Adrianople and set off towards the Bulgarians. After reaching Versinikia, the Byzantines, despite of their indisputable numerical superiority14, did not decide to attack the heavily fortified Bulgarian positions and attempted to lure the Bulgarians out of them into the open field. According to the Continuator of Theophanes, Michael I Rangaves repeatedly summoned the Bulgarians to battle, but they did not dare to attack. The fact that the Byzantines did not attack, but called for a battle, shows that they didn’t wish to fight on the chosen by the Bulgarians positions, but they tried to bring them out to the open plains. Khan Krum didn’t fall to the Byzantine provocations and the Bulgarian troops didn’t leave their positions. For 15 days the two armies stood formed one against the other, but the Byzantines didn’t launch any decisive attack15, but were content with isolated attacks against the Bulgarian positions, expressed mainly as skirmishes with ranged weapons. Finally the Bulgarians managed to impose their own tactics, this wrecked the nerves of the Byzantine strategists and they compelled Emperor Michael I Rangaves to issue an order for attack.

Considering the battle line of the Bulgarian forces, there aren’t any reports. One of the Byzantine wings was taken by the forces of the Macedonia and Thrace themes, commanded by the strategus of the Macedonia theme Ioan Aplakis, and the other wing – by the forces of the Anatolik and probably the Armeniak theme. The rest of the imperial forces, together with the tagmas, were in the centre of the battle formation and were commanded directly by the emperor.

Despite of the general order for attack, the imperial forces didn’t attack simultaneously. First in battle entered the troops, commanded by Ioan Aplakis. Their attack was not immediately supported by the rest of the Byzantine forces. According to Scriptor Incertus, which gives the most detailed records of the battle, the other imperial troops didn’t back up this attack. The first, according to this Byzantine source, fled the forces of the Anatolik theme16. These reports are backed up also by other Byzantine chroniclers, but there’s also a contrary thesis, according to which the soldiers of the Anatolik theme fought bravely and the first to flee were the forces in the centre, commanded directly by the emperor17. In this case it’s a matter of a lack of coordination in the realization of the attack among the imperial army. The troops, commanded by Michael I Rangaves and Leo, were delayed in supporting the attack of those, commanded by Ioan Aplakis. This difference in the actions of the imperial army, combined with the fact that descending from the heights of their own positions and climbing to the heights of the Bulgarian ones would lead to a breaking of the Byzantine battle lines, proved to be fatal for the forces of the empire. Khan Krum made use of this situation and the Bulgarian army moved on to a counter-attack18.

The Bulgarian detachments attacked firstly the forces of Ioan Aplakis, which were probably outflanked, because of which they’re in a bad position. After this, the Bulgarian troops engaged also the Byzantine contingents, positioned at the centre, and by this way Khan Krum used the confusion of the imperial forces and practically tore them to three separate parts, which he crushed consecutively. The last to enter the battle were the forces of the Anatolik theme. From the claim of most of the sources that they were the first to flee, and according to some – even without any engagement in a fight, it’s clearly seen that they established the last contact with the enemy: at this moment of the battle the Bulgarian forces were obviously having a serious advantage in the fight, because of which the forces, commanded by Leo, fled after a short engagement. Soon after them also the detachments at the centre, commanded personally by the emperor, were taking a flight. The rout of the main part of the enemy’s army and the continuing fierce resistance of the Macedonians and the Thracians, which were surrounded by the Bulgarian forces and were nearly completely destroyed together with their commander Ioan Aplakis, initially caused Krum to act carefully. He waited for some time to see if his enemy wasn’t preparing an ambush or outflanking for him19. Only after he was convinced that the Byzantines were really routing, he gave the orders to the whole army to start a general pursuit of the enemy. The Byzantine defeat was catastrophic. The Bulgarians looted the Byzantine camp and chased the enemy to a great depth. The Byzantine forces stopped their flight only at Constantinople20.

The Battle of Versinikia is scrutinized so detailed, because there are the fullest descriptions of it in the sources. Because of which it gives us the greatest possibility to analyze the tactics of the Bulgarian army. The fact that the Bulgarian forces use in it tactics, used also in other battles, for which there are not so detailed descriptions, shows that there is a developed and stable Bulgarian tactic, which was used for more than a century now.

In the only battle, in which the Bulgarians probably attacked frontally the enemy, the Battle of Anchialus (763), they suffered a heavy defeat. The description of this battle is short and vague, because of which its analysis is quite difficult. But the general progress of the fierce fight, which was a long-lasting one, suggests that the Bulgarians have frontally attacked the enemy, as a result of which there were many casualties on both sides. The violence of the fight is confirmed also by the report of Patriarch Nicephorus that actually Constantine V Kopronim was crushed near Anchialus and the Byzantines suffered great casualties in manpower in the battle21.

Initially the Bulgarian forces held on to the usual temporizing tactics also in this military campaign. They positioned themselves on preliminary fortified positions in the fore-mountains along the South-Eastern slopes of the Aytos Mountain. Later on, due to unknown reasons, Khan Telets changed his initial plan, went down to the field near Anchialus and entered a battle on a flat country, suitable for the combined actions of the Byzantine infantry and cavalry. The Byzantine positions were additionally strengthened by the fact that the rear of the imperial armies was covered by the nearby Anchialus fortress, which did not allow the Bulgarians to make deep flank-movements on the enemy. The Byzantine positions were probably placed between the South-Western bank of the Pomorie Lake and the Black Sea coast. Such a position makes impossible any attempts for outflanking and deep flank-movements in the rear from the side of the enemy. In this position of the imperial forces, the only possible decision of the Bulgarian ruler could be a frontal attack. Such an attack was doomed to failure because the cavalry was not capable to break through a dense phalanx of heavily-armed infantry spearmen. Because of which the authors of the Byzantine military treatises prescribe on a plain and open terrain against nations, having a strong cavalry and using orders similar to the Bulgarian battle order, to act with a dense phalanx of heavily-armed spearmen22. Khan Telets obviously didn’t assess the situation right and took a wrong tactical decision, which led to a catastrophic defeat of the Bulgarian forces.

The Battle of Anchialus (708) demonstrates another tactical method, used on the battlefield by the Bulgarian army – surprise attack in the moment, in which the enemy’s battle line is disorganized for some reason. Khan Tervel used the scattering of the Byzantine cavalry in search for fodder and surprisingly attacked his enemy. The enemy cavalry didn’t manage to re-form and was crushed, whereas its rout probably caused the rout also of the whole Byzantine army23.

After victory in a particular battle, the Bulgarians did launch a pursuit to a great depth with the aim of destroying maximum number of enemy soldiers. After the defeat of the Byzantines at the Onglos, the enemy was chased around 150-200 km. till the vicinity of the Varna region, in which a large part of the enemy military effectives was destroyed. This is one of the reasons why Constantine IV Pogonatus couldn’t organize a counter-advance against the Bulgarians in the next few years and was forced to accept and keep the peace. After the victory at Markele – 792, the Bulgarian forces pursued the Byzantines all the way to Constantinople, because the latter stopped their flight only there, and during the pursuit itself were destroyed a large number of enemy soldiers, as well as many and famous Byzantine strategists, among which was also the famous Michael Lahanodrakon24. After the victory at Versinikia (22.VI.813) the Bulgarians again chased the enemy to a great distance – almost to the vicinity of Constantinople, because also in this case the Byzantines stopped their flight in the imperial capital.

One of the strongest tactical weapons, used by the Bulgarian khans, was the ambush combined with a night attack on the enemy. A brilliant example for the realization of such tactics was the battle in the night of 26.VII.811, in which Khan Krum shattered the Byzantine army, commanded by Nicephorus I Genikus. A part of the Bulgarian troops have obviously done a parallel to the Byzantines march, following their movement, while in the same time the rest of the Bulgarian, Slavic and Avar military contingents have moved in the direction of the main Bulgarian military forces, placed at a preliminary chosen and fortified position25.

When the enemy reached this preliminary chosen position, Khan Krum ordered his advance to be stopped through flanking strikes, but without the Bulgarians entering a general fight. This hypothesis is confirmed by the setting up of a Byzantine camp near the Bulgarian fortifications, and by the words of the emperor that “even if we were birds, we wouldn’t be able to fly over”.

The Byzantines were forced to stop because in marching columns they wouldn’t be able to successfully counteract the Bulgarian raids. These events probably took place at dusk and considering the forces fatigue from the march, the strategists and the basileos decided to set up a camp and fight a battle the next day. Due to the presence of the Bulgarian cavalry the enemy couldn’t build up a camp by all the rules of the military art and the marching columns settled down in the places where they had stopped. As a result of this dislocation the tagmas, which guarded the emperor, have probably remained at the centre of the marching columns, but there was some distance between them and the rest of the troops, which is confirmed also by the sources. According to the reports of Theophanes, Emperor Nicephorus and the people around him heard strange noises in the night26, which suggests that the preparation of the Bulgarian attack was heard only by the archons and the tagmas, surrounding the imperial person, therefore the rest of the forces were positioned in some distance, because of which they didn’t immediately learn about the start of the Bulgarian attack.

Khan Krum awaited his enemy and probably withdrew his forces to a certain distance, demonstrating willingness to fight the other day. Only this way could be interpreted the fact that the Byzantine army didn’t stay in battle alert the whole night and a part of the soldiers were allowed to have a sleep. The khan used this moment and ordered probably to the heavy cavalry, which is the main striking force of the Bulgarian army, to attack the tagmas. The latter didn’t endure long to this frontal night attack and were routed after a short resistance, while Nicephorus I Genikus, left without guards, was killed. The rout of the tagmas, the most elite part of the Byzantine army, and the news of the emperor’s death demoralized the other forces and they panically fled. The fortified positions, erected by the Bulgarians at the northern slopes of Stara Planina [Tr. Note: the Balkan Mountains], detained the enemy’s rout and he sustained great casualties. Unlike the other battles, in which the Bulgarians were victors, this time they didn’t organize a deep pursuit. Probably one of the main reasons for this was the exhaustion of the Bulgarian forces and the low number of the efficient Bulgarian military effectives – because of which Khan Krum, in order to increase the numbers of his forces, had to recruit many Slavs and Avars [Tr. Note: and women, by the way], although they did help defeating the Byzantines, as it is seen in the official feasts, organized only several days after the battle, with the participation of their chieftains. But the Bulgarian ruler probably didn’t trust them enough and therefore he preferred, instead of organizing a pursuit, to be satisfied with the achieved victory, stabilizing his power in the interior of the state. The detailed analysis of this battle allows us to see the way how the Bulgarian forces applied the tactics of ambushes and night attacks, for the use of which there are a number of reports in the sources27.

The various arsenal of tactical methods, used by the Bulgarian army during the considered period, shows that the Bulgarians until and during the IX c. continued using tactics, characteristic for the tribes, which populate the steppes of Asia and Europe. In the same time they acquired a number of achievements of the Byzantine military science, which contributed to the increase of their military might. The mixing of different tactical schools, the one of the steppe nomads and the Byzantine school, descendant of the top achievements of the ancient military thought, allowed the Bulgarian state, despite of its limited resources, to successfully oppose the much stronger in economical aspect Byzantine Empire, and in a number of cases – also to win brilliant victories.

[1] Leonis Imperatoris Tactica // PG, 107, 1863, col. 672–1120, 43–60, col. 956 D-961 D= ГИБИ [Tr. Note: ГИБИ – Гръцки Източници за Българска История; GSBH – Greek Sources for Bulgarian History], 4, с. 168–171.

2 Leo, Tact., XVIII, 43; 45; 75 PG, 107, col. 956 D-957 А; 964 D=ГИБИ, 4, с. 168, 172.

3 Mauricii Strategicon, ed. T. Dennis, Wien, 1981 // CFHB, 17, XI, 2, 5–78 (p. 360–366)= ГИБИ, 2, с. 278–280.

4 Leo, Tact., XVIII, 43, PG, 107, col. 956 D-957 A= ГИБИ, 4, с. 168.

5 Leo, Tact., XVIII, 48, 50–52, 56, 58, 63, PG, 107, col. 957 С-D; 960 В-С; 961 A= ГИБИ, 4, с. 169–170.

6 Nicephori Archiepiscopi Constantinopolitani Opuscula Historica, Ed. C. de. Boor, Lipsiae, 1880, p. 35, 1-6= ГИБИ, 3, с. 296; Turner D., The trouble with the Trinity: the context of a slogan during the reign of Constantine IV (668–85) // BMGS, 27, 2003, 68–119, p. 90.

7 Theophanes Confesor Chronographia, ed. C. de Boor, Lipsiae, 1883, p. 358, 27-30; 359, 4-5= ГИБИ, 3, с. 263; Niceph., p. 35, 7-9; 11-13= ГИБИ, 3, с. 296.

8 Niceph., p. 35, 9-11= ГИБИ, 3, с. 296.

9 Theoph., p. 431, 6-9= ГИБИ, 3, с. 270.

10 Theoph., p. 467, 29-33= ГИБИ, 3, с. 277; Haldon J.F., Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565–1204, L., 1999, p. 211.

11 Theoph., p. 470, 19-21= ГИБИ, 3, с. 277.

12 Theoph., p. 500, 12-14; Scriptor Incertus, Historia de Leone Bardae filio apud: Leonis Grammatici Chronographia, Ex rec. I. Bekkeri, Bonnae, 1842, 335–362, p. 336, 19-21; Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, Ed. I. Bekker, Bonnae, 1838, p. 13, 19-20.

13 Scriptor Incertus, p. 336, 16-18; Ioannis Scylitzae Synopsis Historiarum, Eds. Beck H.-G., Kambylis A., Keydell R., Berlin, 1973, p. 5, 80- 6, 82= ГИБИ, 6, с. 226; Ioannis Zonarae, Epitomae Historiarum libri XIII-XVIII, ed. T. Büttner-Wobst, Tomus III, Bonnae, 1897 // CSHB, XV, 18, 5 (p. 317, 1-2)= ГИБИ, 7, с. 165.

14 Theoph., p. 500, 28–31; Scriptor Incertus, p. 337, 9-10, 22-23 = ГИБИ, 4, 17–18.

15 Scriptor Incertus, p. 337, 9-13= ГИБИ, 4, с. 17; Beševliev V., Die protobulgarische Periode der bulgarischen Geschichte, Amsterdam, 1980, S. 253–254.

16 Theoph., p. 501, 1–2= ГИБИ, 4, с. 288; Scriptor Incertus, p. 337, 18-340, 7-8= ГИБИ, 4, с. 18–19.

17 Theoph. Cont., p. 15, 18-21= ГИБИ, 5, с. 111.

18 Scriptor Incertus, p. 337, 22-338, 1= ГИБИ, 4, с. 18.

19 Theoph., p. 501, 32-34= ГИБИ, 3, с. 289.

20 Scriptor Incertus, p. 338, 17-22= ГИБИ, 4, с. 18; Theoph., p. 501, 34-502, 1-2= ГИБИ, 3, с. 289.

21 Niceph., Antirrhesis ІІІ, col. 508 B; Georgius Monachos, p. 762, 25-763, 14= ГИБИ, 4, с. 52, ed. C de. Boor.

22 Mauricii, Strat., XI, 1, 42-44 (p. 356) = ГИБИ, 2, с. 278; Leo., Tact., XVIII, 63, PG, col. 961 A= ГИБИ, 4, с. 170.

23 Niceph., p. 43, 12-15; Haldon J., Warfare, State..., p. 211.

24 Theoph., p. 467, 32-468, 4= ГИБИ, 3, с. 277

25 Narratio anonyma e Codice Vaticano, Ed. Dujčev Iv., 1965, p. 212, 41-42= ГИБИ, 4, с. 13; Theoph., p. 490, 29-31.

26 Theoph., p. 490, 33-491, 3= ГИБИ, 3, с. 282.

27 ЛИБИ [Tr. Note: ЛИБИ – Латински Източници за Българска История; LSBH – Latin Sources for Bulgarian History], 1, с. 411–412; с. 313.

Original: http://www.vi-books.com/vis/vis4_3/01.htm

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